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Microelectronic circuit is ubiquitous component of modern electrical devices. The 
increasing complexity and professionality of phases in microelectronic supply chain 
bring more global cooperation to integrated circuit (IC) production. Therefore, 
providing a secure environment for microelectronic circuit design does not ensure the 
integrity of the hardware since any participator of IC fabrication has the opportunity to 
implant a malicious alteration in original IC design. Especially overseas chip-
fabrication is a vital potential threat for national defense products. In theory, anyone 
who has access to fabrication process can tamper with the original design, with the 
potential to change function, modify parametric properties or even have confidential 
information transmitted to the attacker. The surreptitious modification of an IC is 
denoted as Hardware Trojan (HT). To address the issue of providing robust and reliable 
IC products, this dissertation proposes HT detection techniques which are based on HT 
activation and side-channel analysis. Simulation results show that the proposed 
technique can detect HT with areas that are 0.013% of the host-circuitry. Combinational 
use of multiple detection techniques will facilitate detection probability. Also, low 
power-delay-product (PDP) VLSI design is considered for optimizing parametric 
overhead of detection circuit. Simulation results indicate that the proposed VLSI design 
optimization techniques can improve PDP of dynamic and static CMOS circuits by up 
to 61.9% and 49.9%, respectively.  
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Microelectronic circuit is ubiquitous component of modern electrical devices. 
The increasing complexity and professionality of phases in microelectronic supply 
chain bring more global cooperation to integrated circuit (IC) production. Also 
outsourcing of IC manufacture to low-cost location is effective to counteract market 
pressure. Hardware integrity is becoming a serious topic with more and more entities 
involving in IC production, since any participator of IC fabrication has the opportunity 
to implant a hardware Trojan (malicious alteration of genuine IC) to original IC design. 
The hardware Trojan insertion has been considered as a serious threat in the past decade 
[1]-[6]. About 3,000 years ago, after 10 years fruitless conquering the city of Troy, the 
Greek army pretended to sail away leaving behind a huge wooden horse that actually 
with some Greek solider inside. The Trojans pulled the horse into Troy. Greek forces 
slipped out of the horse and opened the gate for the sailing back Greek army, then ended 
the war [7]. Hardware Trojan (HT) is similar that is a tiny alteration of original circuit 
design that may distorter prescribed IC function. 
A HT can remain active or stay dormant until activation criteria happens. The HT 
activation signal may be an external signal (e.g. interact with off-chip signals by 
antenna, sensor) or an internal signal (e.g. logic, operation timing). An active HT may 
change the functionality when compared to the original design [8], tamper with 
parametric properties [9], or even have confidential information transmitted to the 
attacker [10].  
Detection of such HT is difficult due to the following reasons: 
1) Reverse engineering and physical inspection of post-fab chips are time and 
money costly for IC supply chain, also it is not security guarantee for the 
2 
remaining ICs. 
2) Compare to the tremendously increasing complexity of modern IC, the 
embedded HT is typically with relatively very tiny size that is hard to be 
revealed. 
3) Due to stealthy nature, normally HT is triggered by a rare signal and remain 
dormant mode in most lifetime. It will reduce the operating effect of HT on 
host-chip thereby even further enhancing the difficulty to distinguish it. 
4) With feature size decreasing, process and environmental variations have 
emerged more impact on circuit parameters. HT detections using simple 
parameter-analysis have become more and more ineffective. 
5) Unknown location and form of HT blinds its detection specification.  
1.2 Hardware Security  
HT structure, characterization, and countermeasures are introduced in this section. 
1.2.1 Hardware Trojan Structure  
A typical HT structure consists of trigger logic and payload, as shown in Fig. 1.1 
[11]. The trigger logic monitors HT trigger signal which is a set of signals activating 
HT circuit thereby with payload effected. To maintain stealthy nature of HT in testing 
mode, the fundamental in this case is that trigger signal has low controllability while 
HT effect has low observability, that means trigger signal should be relatively very rare 
case compare to other signals on chip [12].     
Trigger Payload
Hardware Trojan
Trigger Signal HT Effect
 
Fig. 1.1 HT Structure 
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1.2.2 Characterization of Hardware Trojans  
An unknown HT may be triggered by various signal, consist of various form of 
HT circuit, and act as various payload. That is a serious puzzle for chip designers to 
counteract the potential HT insertion. To properly evaluate HTs and propose effective 
countermeasures, HT is classified and analyzed in this section. Typically, HT is 
characterized by its activation mechanism (referred as trigger), physical design 
(referred as HT circuit), and action effect (referred as payload), shown in Fig. 1.2 [5]. 
Note that HT may hybrid of these classification, for example, activated by multiple 



























Fig. 1.2 HT Classification 
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1.2.2.1 Activation Characteristics 
HT activation characteristics refer to the criteria that trigger HT thereafter 
proceeding its effect. Activation characteristics are classified into internally activated 
and externally activated.  
An internally activated TH can be subdivided into always-on and conditions 
based. Always-on represents the HT being active at all times, for example, a reduced 
wire in clock-tree. Clock-tree is used to distribute clock signal to clocked elements at 
the same time. A chip that is modified in this way will suffer from clock skew that may 
producing errors or fails every time the wire is used intensely. Adversary may deploy 
always-on HT in area with rare operation to remain silent. Condition based activation 
monitors one or more signals inside IC as trigger. It can be either analog signal (e.g., 
temperature, delay, timing), or digital signal (e.g., Boolean logic function).  
The opposite is externally activated TH. There can be malicious logic inside a 
chip, that uses an antenna or sensors receiving HT trigger signal from outside of IC. 
Due to the isolation of IC die and the outer signal, this trigger must be analog signal 
(e.g., radio). In this case, the adversary may even communicate with the inserted HT in 
real-time. 
1.2.2.2 Physical Characteristics 
HT physical characteristics refer to the physical design of HT. The physical HT 
characteristics include distribution, structure, type, and size. 
HT distribution represents the layout density of HT on chip, that consists of tight 
and loose. Tight distribution HT has its components relatively close in chip layout, 
whereas loose distribution HT distributes its components loosely across the chip layout. 
The reason why HT may distribute loose or tight is: 1) it is dependent on free layout 
area in original chip. The adversary is unwilling to redesign the existing layout in host-
5 
chip, because change of original design may affect its operation parameters (e.g., 
modified layout wire may change signal delivery time) that is prone to be an abnormal 
testing. 2) variable location of HT trigger signal and HT effect area on chip to meet HT 
design specification. Note that HT with loose distribution will scatter its parameter 
effect on host-chip thereby benefit its silent characteristic. However, communication of 
loose distributed components requires increased wires that attendant increased timing 
and power effect on host-chip. 
HT structure is subclassified into layout-change and layout-same, indicating host-
chip’s original layout is changed and unchanged, respectively. Though change of 
original layout may increase the abnormal detection probability, HT designers 
sometimes still force to do so, because: 1) HT is eager to squeeze into a specific area 
utilizing the operations in it (e.g., use the signal in this area as trigger or modify the 
function in this area.). 2) scattering HT in free layout areas requires long wires for 
communication of each partition of HT. The increased wires further change the delay 
and power characteristics of host-chip, breaking HT’s silence. Therefore, changing the 
original layout to harbor HT with tight distribution may benefit some HT designs. Also 
hiding technology (e.g., power gating) can be used to facilitate stealthy nature of HT.       
HT type describes the implementation type of HT that is partitioned to functional 
type and parametric type. Functional type represents the HT causing addition or 
deletion of transistors or gates, which is relatively popular due to its various possible 
functionalities, whereas parametric type indicates the HT modifying original circuit, 
like thinning of wires, weakening of flip-flops or transistors, subjecting the chip to 
radiation, or using focused ion beams (FIB) to reduce the reliability of a chip. A 
parametric type HT example is presented as in Fig. 1.3 [13]. It is an inverter attacked 
by dopant HT reversing dopant polarity in specific area to change the behavior of gate. 
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In original inverter, shown in Fig. 1.3 (a), the PMOS (top) transistor consists n-well, 
positively doped source and drain (p-dopant), while the NMOS transistor (bottom) 
includes p-well, negatively doped source and drain (n-dopant). With dopant HT, as 
shown in Fig. 1.3 (b), the p-dopant in PMOS is replaced by n-dopant, so power source 
VDD remains connecting to source, n-well, then drain; in the source of NMOS, p-dopant 
instead of n-dopant is applied thereby ground Vss is isolated from drain regardless of its 
gate input. As a result, the dopant HT attacked inverter will permanently output VDD. 
 
Fig. 1.3 Inverter Gate without (a) and with dopant HT (b) 
HT size accounts for the number of component that have been added, deleted or 
altered. HT with large size looks like is easier to be detected, however HT with small 
size may lose ability monitoring complicated rare trigger that increases its activation 
probability, eventually harming silence of HT. 
1.2.2.3 Action Characteristics 
HT action characteristics refer to the effect of HT once its triggered. The HT 
action characteristics include transit-information, modify-specification, and modify-
function. 
A HT with transit-information action will transit confidential information from 
host-chip to adversary. For example, in 2014 January, the magazine of New York Times 
7 
reported that the Quantum program has helped intelligence agencies to receive data 
from computers miles away by using tiny circuits inserted surreptitiously into system 
transiting a covert channel of radio wave [14].   
Modify-specification refer to HT attacking the parameter properties (e.g., delay) 
of host-chip. It may change or disable the expected host-chip operation. For example, 
HT can change designed chip operation by exhausting scarce resources such as 
bandwidth, computation, and battery power. A HT can be designed to consume excess 
battery energy by preventing circuits from going to sleep; alter stored data by over-
writing an existing value with a random value; or even disable operation by simply 
isolate partial or all power supply from circuits. In 2007, a Syrian radar failed to warn 
an air strike, later that is reported be responsible by a backdoor built in the system chip 
[15]. 
Modify-function refer to HT modify designed function of host-chip by adding 
extra logic components or bypassing original circuits. Because HT with modify-
specification action only has ability to change existing components, it can lead to 
operation failure. However, HT with modify-function action can build its own logic 
thereby implement more possible unexpected operations. 
1.2.3 Hardware Trojan Countermeasures 
The goal of HT countermeasure is to ensure that the IC product used by customer 
is authentic. IC production process includes design, fabrication, testing, and operation, 
shown in Fig. 1.4. The best way to prevent HT-attack on IC is to tightly control the 
process from beginning to end. Typically, IC design mode and testing mode are 
conducted by IC designers, thereafter IC is deployed in operation mode with customer. 
IC manufacture fabrication is considered as the only untrusted mode (out control of IC 
designer) that is normally outsourced to dedicated IC foundries. Many HT 
8 
countermeasures are published in the past decade [1][3]. They can be classified into 
three types: pre-silicon, post-silicon, and in-field HT countermeasures, shown in Fig. 
1.5, which are refer to IC design, testing, and operation mode, respectively. 
FabricationDesign OperationTesting
 














Fig. 1.5 HT Countermeasures 
1.2.3.1 Pre-Silicon Hardware Trojan Countermeasures 
Preventing HT insertion is considered in pre-silicon testing mode before 
fabrication. To insert HT, an attacker needs two requirements: 1) understand original 
IC design, or at least familiar with partial IC design that will be attacked; 2) have 
enough resource on-chip to serve HT, like trigger signal, layout area, power source. 
Preventing HT insertion consists of camouflage and exhausting resource, that 
counteracting the two HT insertion requirements, respectively. 
1. Camouflage 
Camouflage, as the name indicates, is a strategy to hide the genuine components 
9 
and IC logic, thereby obfuscating HT design when interface to host-IC. Camouflaging 
components design benefits inhibiting IC attackers from extracting genuine gate-level 
netlist. It can be done by altering layout of standard cell [16][17], adding dummy 
contacts, or useless connections between layers [18][19]. To hide IC logic, original 
circuit is accompanied with a locking circuit which is transparent when a specific key 
is applied. The increasing complexity of distinguishing locking circuit with unknown 
key impedes the design of practical HT. In [20], authors added an XOR gate and an 
inverter to standard half-adder that will work functionally only when prescribed key-
bit meets criteria. Note that the modification of original logic or standard components 
may degrade the IC operation performance.  
2. Exhausting Resource 
To avoid detection, normally designers squeeze HT size to minimize its effect on 
host-chip. Furthermore, sophisticated HT design may use exiting circuit on chip for 
HT’s trigger signal generator or even activity. Exhausting free resources on chip will 
occupy the elements that may be used by HT. Some examples are presented below. 
Layout Space: Since design tools are typically conservative in circuit layout 
placement, there are always free layout spaces in IC design. Filler cells are used to fill 
up these spaces. Attackers may replace the filler cells with HT without affecting 
original function cells. To counteract this case, we can modify all unused silicon to be 
looks like functional circuit which is denoted as functional filler [21]. Genuine circuitry 
accompanied with realistic functional filler will embarrass HT designers when finding 
either available HT inserting spot or practical HT trigger. However, the functional 
fillers will increase power consumption thereby generating heat in limited spaces 
further degrading IC performance. 
Power Source: A HT consume power for both monitoring trigger in dormant 
10 
mode and effecting payload in active mode. Constraining power supply to barely satisfy 
normal operational requirement is effective in squeezing power use for HT. It can be 
done through partitioning IC into segments which use separate power rails. Each 
partitioned power rail is designed with capability to deliver sufficient current for the 
corresponding circuit segment. Thereafter, inserted HT may rob normal used power 
supply, resulting error function.  
State: Occupy or eliminate unused states of sequential circuit. An example is 
introduced with a finite-state machine (FSM) which is a mathematical model of 
computation that can be in one of finite number of states. An FSM of five states, 
requires three (23 > 5) state elements with binary encoding [22]. The three (23 − 5 =
3) unused states may be used as a sequential HT trigger signal without effect on host 
circuit. In this case, two sub-FSM with smaller states can generate five states, shown in 
Fig. 1.6, meanwhile eliminate useless states that may be used by HT designer. Sub-
FSM FSM1 consists of four states (S0, S1, S2, S3), while FSM2 consists of two states 
(S’0, S’1). They have one overlapping state (S3/S’0). 
S0 S1 S2 S3/S'0 S'1
FSM FSM1 2
 
Fig. 1.6 FSM of Five States Implemented by Two Sub-FSM 
As aforementioned, both camouflage and exhausting resource may degrade IC 
performance. Balance of IC authentication and operation performance is a critical 
concern for designers.    
1.2.3.2 Post-Silicon Hardware Trojan Countermeasures 
HT detection of a chip is conducted in post-silicon testing mode before 
deployment. Detecting HT is a serious challenge due to its stealthy nature, inordinately 
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large number of possible instances and large variety in structure and operation mode. 
Traditional fault testing techniques are insufficient in this extraordinary situation. A 
manufacturing fault happens at a random position whereas malicious changes are well 
placed to avoid detection. The HT detection is subclassified into destructive and non-
destructive detections. 
Destructive HT detection refers to reverse engineering which is an invasive and 
destructive form of analyzing an IC chip. Reverse engineers grind away IC die layer by 
layer and microphoto the netlists. Sometimes it is even possible to attach a probe to 
measure voltages while the IC is still operational. This technique has ability to reveal 
complete hardware of the IC chip. Thereafter its used to detect HT by comparing the 
netlists of testing IC with original design [23]. Destructive HT detection is possible to 
achieve 100% detection probability, whereas attendant extreme high timing and money-
cost. Also, this method, as the name indicates, can only be used on a sample group of 
ICs with no guarantee that untested ICs are Trojan-free. However destructive HT 
detection can be used to characterize the 100% genuine IC (e.g., power/timing 
fingerprint) to facilitate other detection methods. 
Non-destructive HT detection consists of HT activation, functional testing, and 
side-channel analysis. 
1. HT Activation 
Due to stealthy nature of HT, typically it uses rare cases as trigger to avoid 
accidental activation or detection during testing mode. Staying in dormant can avoid 
unnecessary function change and tremendously reduce the differential operating 
parameters caused by HT, eventually limit the HT detection probability. Triggering HT 
will therefore benefit the efficiency of traditional detection techniques, like HT 
detection based on functional testing or side-channel analysis. In [24], authors proposed 
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a dummy scan flip-flop inserting to nodes with low transition probability (may use as 
trigger signal) for reducing transition time. Thereafter all nodes on host-chip could have 
transition probability more than a specific level, and rare signals will appear in greater 
opportunity. 
2. Functional Testing 
HT detection based on functional testing compares functional response of testing 
IC with the designed ones. HT presence is declared when it affects functional response 
during testing mode. In [25], authors detect HT using a randomization-based technique 
to probabilistically compare the operational function of testing IC with the designed 
function. Note that a dormant HT will minimize its effect, especially functional 
response, on host-chip. HT activation technology is effective in constrain time to run 
functional testing-based HT detection.    
3. Side-Channel Analysis 
Side-channel analysis is popular in HT detection, because HT insertion affects 
the host-circuit’s side-channel parameters consist of timing, power consumption, and 
electromagnetic emanation (EM). HT can be revealed by distinguishing the differential 
side-channel parameters of the attacked circuit. Also, HT activation technology may 
wake HT, if exist, increasing its activity to facilitate side-channel analysis.   
Embedded HT adds extra capacitance, resulting in more charging and discharging 
delays to HT affected paths. Authors in [26] chose a number of clean (free of HTs) ICs 
and ran a variety of input patterns to record specific delays of paths to establish key 
delay fingerprints. The testing ICs are simulated under the same input patterns and 
verified by comparing timing parameters with genuine fingerprint. 
Embedded HT adds current paths and loads to the original circuit, that result in 
extra power consumption on wires and gates in HT affected area. In [27], authors 
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distinguish the HT-attacked IC by comparing the power traces of testing ICs with 
genuine IC. Statistical methods are used to improve the detection probability. 
Operation of electrical circuits is attendant emitting signals like magnetic and 
electric fields. Those signals can be analyzed to conclude the operational state and data 
in the testing circuit. Authors in [28] propose a detection technique for hard-to-detect 
points by using an electromagnetic probe to trace electromagnetic emanation for each 
transition step point in testing chip. 
1.2.3.3 In-Field Hardware Trojan Countermeasures 
The aforementioned classes of HT detection are applied prior to deployment, 
however a sophisticated HT with parameter-muted design (e.g., power gating,) may 
have ability to bypass all pre-deployment detections thereafter releasing malicious 
effect in-field. A self-detection design is necessary in field to compensate this loophole, 
such that HT countermeasure can take place when dormant HT is activated in customer 
use. A practical self-detection circuit should have three specifications: 1) low-overhead, 
2) work friendly with host-chip at speed, 3) react with HT to stop hurting chip-user 
(warning, turn off power, etc.). In [29], a real-time trust evaluation framework is 
proposed to monitor IC global power consumption in field and warn abnormal 
operations if happens. In [30], a concurrent error detection (CED) technique is used in 
field to detect malicious signal derived from HT. 
1.3 VLSI Design Optimization 
Circuit operation at high frequencies while consuming low power is one of the 
most important characteristics in designing ICs. Also, parametric overhead of host-chip 
associate with HT countermeasures is a serious concern for IC designers. The added 
components will bring extra current path and load to original design. VLSI design 
optimization is thereby studied to minimize HT countermeasure overhead. 
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1.4 Dissertation Objective 
There are two objectives in this dissertation: 
• Develop, implement and assess effective HT detection techniques with high 
detection probability, low overhead, and tunable detection probability to 
accommodate different security requirements of circuit designs.  
• Develop, implement, and assess the performance of VLSI design 
optimization techniques that can be used to benefit high performance CMOS 
circuit design, especially constraining HT detection circuit overhead. 
1.5 Dissertation Organization 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces a design 
increasing probability of rare signals which may be the trigger of HT to facilitate the 
HT detection efficiency. Chapter 3 and 4 present HT detection methodologies based on 
timing and power-analysis, respectively. Combinational use of HT detection methods 
and its benefits are introduced in chapter 5. VLSI design optimization for dynamic and 
static CMOS circuit design are proposed in chapter 6 and 7, respectively. Eventually, 
chapter 8 presents conclusion and future work. 
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2 Hardware Trojan Detection Efficiency Improvement 
This chapter introduces a probability-increase-circuit (PIC) increasing probability 
of rare signal which may be the trigger of hardware Trojan (HT) to facilitate the HT 
detection efficiency. Preliminary results for a standard HT example show a reduction in 
time for HT activation of over 95% with modest increase in power, size, and delay 
overhead. The discussion in this chapter is substantially drawn from [31], where we 
first reported the development and evaluation of this technique. 
2.1 Introduction 
To have a reliable microelectronic product, HT detection has become a critical 
concern for researches in the past decade.  
An embedded HT will add extra timing and power consumption to the HT 
affected area. As long as the differences of timing and power consumption of circuit-
under-test (CUT) and genuine chip are not coverable by process and environmental 
variations, the CUT is declared as HT-attacked. Efficient input patterns may magnify 
HT impact on operating parameters of host-chip that facilitates distinguishing HT from 
host-chip. Reference [32] applies specific input patterns to lower host circuit activity 
while keep HT active to maximize the HT contribution in power consumption. 
Resistance and capacitance impact of HT on the timing of host-chip are magnified using 
specific input patterns in [26]. Current integration is proposed to detect HT and analyze 
its location in [33]. Also input patterns are used to increase the switching probability of 
host chip for improving the efficiency of detection.  
As seen, in prior works, researchers exploit the difference of operating parameters 
on genuine ICs and testing ICs as a basis for HT detection methodologies. However 
due to the stealthy nature of HT, typically its designed to bypass or disable the security 
fence of a system: it stays in dormant mode in most lifetime that tremendously reduces 
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the differential operating parameters and the HT trigger signal is associated with rare 
input patterns. Therefore, triggering HT will benefit the efficiency of traditional 
detection techniques. In [24], Salmani proposed a dummy scan flip-flop inserting to 
nodes with low transition probability for reducing transition time. Thereafter all nodes 
on host-chip could have transition probability more than a specific level, and rare 
signals will appear in greater opportunity. However, the proposed dummy scan flip-flop 
is with multiple times extra power consumption and 1-2 orders of magnitude larger 
area-overhead that is unacceptable sacrifice in microelectronic circuit industry. In this 
work, we introduce a much simpler design achieving the same goal, but only with 
negligible power and area-overhead. A circuit named probability-increase-circuit (PIC) 
is embedded in rare signal nodes to increase the probability of the rare signal. Geometric 
distribution is applied to model average number of primary input patterns that required 
to convert signal on nodes [34]. 
2.2 Probability-Increase-Circuit (PIC) Insertion 
Signal transition of nodes on chip is induced by change of previous level output, 
while transition of first level components is derived from change of primary inputs. Due 
to the unpredictable location of HT, the transition probability of all nodes on chip should 
be raised to a certain level to avoid rare signal trigger, thereby reducing HT active time. 
For nodes on chip, we assume 𝑃0 and 𝑃1 are probability of having signal ‘0’ and ‘1’, 
respectively. Idle node contains two situations: 𝑃0 ≫ 𝑃1  and 𝑃0 ≪ 𝑃1  that are 
introduced in this section. 
2.2.1 PIC for Rare Signal when 𝑷𝟎 ≫ 𝑷𝟏 
2.2.1.1 PIC Design 
A standard 8-bit AND gate is presented in Fig. 2.1, which output ‘1’ is a rare 
signal example that may be used as HT trigger. The trigger signal (output of AND gate) 
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is activated (high voltage) while all inputs of AND gate (IN1-IN8) are ‘1’. Signal 
probability of nodes in Fig. 2.1 is labeled as format P0, P1 with assumption that primary 
inputs have equal probability of values. As shown in Fig. 2.1, HT trigger signal is 
passive in 255/256 rate, and active in 1/256 rate, that is 𝑃0 ≫ 𝑃1. Based on geometric 
distribution, the average number of primary input patterns that required for triggering 











− 1 = 256   (2.1) 
where 𝑃𝑝 and 𝑃𝑎 are probability of 8-bit AND gate output being passive (low voltage) 
and active (high voltage), respectively. As seen, average 256 input patterns are required 




























Fig. 2.1 8-Bit AND Gate, Signal Probability Label (P0, P1) 
A PIC is developed as shown in Fig. 2.2 to increase the probability of signal 
transition when 𝑃0 ≫ 𝑃1. In Fig. 2.2, NODE is the rare signal node input; OUT is the 
node output; TS (testing switch) is switch of signal transition increase, node signal 
transition probability is increased when TS is ‘1’; input SW (square wave) alternately 
provides ‘1’ and ‘0’ in a certain frequency. To turn on PIC, input TS is switched to ‘1’, 
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CMOS switch is on, then square wave propagates from SW to OR gate. The rare signal 
node is connected to another input (NODE) of OR gate. Thereafter OUT receives the 
same value as NODE when SW is ‘0’, while OUT remains ‘1’ when SW is ‘1’. Because 
SW is square wave and OUT is always ‘1’ when SW is ‘1’, OUT should be ‘1’ in halftime. 
In another halftime, SW switches to ‘0’, OUT is virtually remaining ‘0’ when 𝑃0 ≫ 𝑃1. 
Eventually, 𝑃1 and 𝑃0 of signal OUT are much closer compared to the original design. 
Based on simulation in CMOS IBM 90nm technology, power consumption of PIC in 






Fig. 2.2 Probability Increase Circuit for 𝑃0 ≫ 𝑃1 
The 8-bit AND gate with PIC is present in Fig. 2.3, as seen in which, the 
probability of values in OUT is much closer (735/1024, 289/1024). The average number 











− 1 = 4     (2.2) 
As seen, only 4 rather than 256 input patterns are required to trigger the rare signal OUT 

































Fig. 2.3 8-Bit AND Gate with PIC, Signal Probability Label (P0, P1) 
2.2.1.2 PIC Overhead 
As introduced in chapter 0, Trojan attack is normally happened in untrusted 
fabrication, and its concerned to be detected in post-fab testing mode. Therefore, the 
proposed PIC will only be turned on in testing mode while remains off in field. For 
power-overhead calculation in customer use, the power consumption of PIC in dormant 
mode is taken into account while the host-circuit is active. 8-bit, 16bit and 32-bit AND 
gates are used as CUT simulating with/without PIC. The activation time of rare signal 
in CUTs is shown in Table 2.1, where CUTs operate at input frequency of 1GHz. As 
seen, the rare signal activation time is tremendous reduced by PIC for all CUTs with 
varied sizes.  
Table 2.1 Activation Time of Rare Signal in CUTs 
CUT CUT without PIC CUT with PIC 
8-bit AND 256ns 4ns 
16-bit AND 66us 4ns 
32-bit AND 4.3s 4ns 
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Overhead of PIC in CUTs is shown in Table 2.2, where circuit size is estimated 
by number of transistors; power is simulated in Cadence with CMOS IBM 90nm 
technology when PIC is off (dormant mode); delay is circuit critical path worst delay. 
As seen, even the parameter overhead of PIC is huge for relatively small CUT, it is 
decreased linearly with the increase of corresponding CUT size. In other words, the PIC 
overhead can be restricted to a practical level by limiting the number of PICs in a chip. 
It may be implemented by: 1) decrease the targeting transition probability level; 2) 
apply less PIC in security-robust portion of circuit (e.g., critical path) compared to 
security-sensitive portion of circuit (e.g., memory). Critical path is security-robust, 
because any extra connection on critical path will slow chip operating frequency, which 
can be easily revealed in post-fab functional test. Memory circuit is security-sensitive, 
because the key data stored in memory is prone to be a target for attackers.    
Table 2.2 Overhead of PIC for Rare Signal when 𝑃0 ≫ 𝑃1 
 CUT CUT without PIC CUT with PIC Overhead 
Size 
8-bit AND 42 62 47.6% 
16-bit AND 90 106 17.8% 
32-bit AND 186 202 8.6% 
Power (µW) 
8-bit AND 1.568 1.813 15.6% 
16-bit AND 3.155 3.194 1.2% 
32-bit AND 6.328 6.368 0.6% 
Delay (ps) 
8-bit AND 94 132 40.4% 
16-bit AND 129 167 29.5% 
32-bit AND 176 214 21.6% 
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2.2.2 PIC for Rare Signal when 𝑷𝟎 ≪ 𝑷𝟏 
2.2.2.1 PIC Design 
A standard 8-bit OR gate is presented in Fig. 2.4, which output ‘0’ is a rare signal 
example that may be used as HT trigger. The trigger signal (output of OR gate) is 
activated (low voltage) while all inputs of OR gate (IN1-IN8) are ‘0’. Signal probability 
of nodes in Fig. 2.4 is labeled as format P0, P1 with assumption that primary inputs have 
equal probability of values. As shown in Fig. 2.4, HT trigger signal is active (low 
voltage) in 1/256 rate, and passive (high voltage) in 255/256 rate, that is 𝑃0 ≪ 𝑃1 . 
Based on geometric distribution, the average number of primary input patterns that 











− 1 = 256   (2.3) 
where 𝑃𝑝 and 𝑃𝑎 are probability of 8-bit OR gate output being passive and active, 
respectively; as seen, average 256 input patterns are required to trigger the rare signal 



























Fig. 2.4 8-Bit OR Gate, Probability Label (P0, P1) 
A PIC is developed as shown in Fig. 2.5 to increase the probability of signal 
transition when 𝑃0 ≪ 𝑃1. In Fig. 2.5, NODE is the rare signal node input; OUT is the 
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node output; TS (testing switch) is switch of signal transition increase, node signal 
transition probability is increased when TS is ‘1’; input SW (square wave) alternately 
provides ‘1’ and ‘0’ in a certain frequency. To turn on PIC, input TS is switched to ‘1’, 
CMOS switch is on, then square wave propagates from SW to AND gate. The rare signal 
node is connected to another input (NODE) of AND gate. Thereafter OUT receives the 
same value as NODE when SW is ‘1’, while OUT remains ‘0’ when SW is ‘0’. Because 
SW is square wave and OUT is always ‘0’ when SW is ‘0’, OUT should be ‘0’ in halftime. 
In another halftime, SW switches to ‘1’, OUT is virtually remaining ‘1’ when 𝑃0 ≪ 𝑃1. 
Eventually, 𝑃1 and 𝑃0 of signal OUT are much closer compared to the original design. 
Based on simulation in CMOS IBM 90nm technology, power consumption of PIC in 






Fig. 2.5 Probability Increase Circuit for 𝑃0 ≪ 𝑃1 
The 8-bit OR gate with PIC is present in Fig. 2.6, as seen in which, the probability 
of values in OUT is much closer (289/1024, 735/1024). The average number of primary 











− 1 = 4     (2.4) 
As seen, only 4 rather than 256 input patterns are required to trigger the rare signal OUT 


































Fig. 2.6 8-Bit OR Gate with PIC, Probability Label (P0, P1) 
2.2.2.2 PIC Overhead 
8-bit, 16bit and 32-bit OR gates are used as CUT simulating with/without PIC. 
The activation time of rare signal in CUTs is shown in Table 2.3, where CUTs operate 
at input frequency of 1GHz. As seen, the rare signal activation time is tremendous 
reduced by PIC for all CUTs with varied sizes.  
Table 2.3 Activation Time of Rare Signal in CUTs 
CUT CUT without PIC CUT with PIC 
8-bit AND 256ns 4ns 
16-bit AND 66us 4ns 
32-bit AND 4.3s 4ns 
 
Overhead of PIC in CUTs is shown in Table 2.4, where circuit size is estimated 
by number of transistors; power is simulated in Cadence with CMOS IBM 90nm 
technology when PIC is off (dormant mode); delay is circuit critical path worst delay. 
As seen, even the parameter overhead of PIC is huge for relatively small CUT, it is 
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decreased linearly with the increase of corresponding CUT size. As discussed in section 
2.2.1, the PIC overhead in a chip can be restricted by: 1) decrease the targeting transition 
probability level; 2) apply less PIC in security-robust portion of circuit compared to 
security-sensitive portion of circuit. 
Table 2.4 Overhead of PIC for Rare Signal when 𝑃0 ≪ 𝑃1 
 CUT CUT without PIC CUT with PIC Overhead 
Size 
8-bit OR 42 62 47.6% 
16-bit OR 90 106 17.8% 
32-bit OR 186 202 8.6% 
Power (µW) 
8-bit OR 3.064 3.727 21.6% 
16-bit OR 6.248 6.446 3.2% 
32-bit OR 12.61 12.81 1.6% 
Delay (ps) 
8-bit OR 137 173 26.3% 
16-bit OR 180 216 20% 
32-bit OR 260 290 11.5% 
 
2.3 PIC Insertion Algorithm 
Circuit idle nodes remains in a signal status (either high or low) for most lifetime, 
while leave another signal status as rare signal. The proposed PIC increases signal 
transaction probability by using logic gates to generate rare signal in halftime. The 
procedure of PIC insertion is shown in Fig. 2.7. 
1. Calculate 𝑃0  and 𝑃1  for all nodes on chip based on input probabilities 
(assume unknown input probabilities are equal, 𝑃0 = 𝑃1 ). Order nodes by 
transition probability, which is equal to the product of 𝑃0 and 𝑃1. 
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2. Select transition probability threshold ( 𝑇𝑃𝑡 ). All nodes with transition 
probability less than 𝑇𝑃𝑡 are classified in set A. 
3. If set A is empty, all nodes with transition probability greater than threshold, 
the process is done; otherwise, continue to next step. 
4. Typically, rare situation accumulates by unbalanced signal probability one 
level by one level from primary inputs to outputs, so nodes with less transition 
probability may relatively after nodes with more transition probability. 
Increasing transition probability of nodes closer to primary inputs will 
somehow benefit transition probability of succeeding nodes. Therefore, PIC 
is inserted to the first node (with maximum transition probability) in set A. Go 
back to step 1. 
Start
1. Order nodes by transition probability
2. Select threshold, nodes with transition probability 
under the threshold are classified in set A
3. Set A is 
empty?





Fig. 2.7 PIC Insertion Flow 
2.4 Experimental Result 
A 64-bit binary comparator, shown in Fig. 2.8, is applied as CUT to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the PIC insertion flow. Binary comparator is basic digital arithmetic 
component that operates to compare two binary numbers. A 64-bit binary comparator 
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has two 64-bit binary input (𝐴63 -𝐴0 & 𝐵63 -𝐵0 ) and three binary outputs, which 























































































Fig. 2.8 64-Bit Binary Comparator 
The signal probability of node is indicated as 𝑃𝑛𝑚 = (𝑃1, 𝑃0), in which n stands 
for node, m is node number; 𝑃0 and 𝑃1 are probability of node with signal ‘0’ and ‘1’, 
respectively. With assumption that primary inputs have 𝑃0 = 𝑃1, signal probability of 
nodes in original 64-bit binary comparator are 





























































Signal transition probability (TP) is equal to the product of 𝑃0 and 𝑃1. Then TPs in 
CUT are as following, 











































32 ≈ 0 















64 ≈ 0 
The diminishing order of TP is 𝑇𝑃𝑛4 ,  𝑇𝑃𝑛5 ,  𝑇𝑃𝑛7 ,  𝑇𝑃𝑛8 ,  𝑇𝑃𝑛10 ,  𝑇𝑃𝑛11 ,  𝑇𝑃𝑛1 , 
 𝑇𝑃𝑛2,  𝑇𝑃𝑛3,  𝑇𝑃𝑛6, 𝑇𝑃𝑛9,  𝑇𝑃𝑛12. 
We set 0.1 as signal transition probability threshold (𝑇𝑃𝑡) in this example. Then 
node 𝑛6 , 𝑛9 , and 𝑛12  are classified to set A (𝐴 = {𝑛6, 𝑛9, 𝑛12} ). According to 
algorithm step 4, PIC is embedded in node 𝑛6 and other “A=B” signals in stage 2. This 
circuit is denoted as 64-bit binary comparator with 1-level PIC. 
Re-calculate signal probability and signal transition probability of nodes in 64-bit 
binary comparator with 1-level PIC. The updated results are as: 
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Then, the updated set A consists of node 𝑛9 and 𝑛12. PIC is embedded in node 𝑛9 
and other “A=B” signals in stage 3. This modified circuit is named 64-bit binary 
comparator with 2-level PIC. 
Repeat calculation for signal probability and signal transition probability of nodes 
in 64-bit binary comparator with 2-level PIC. The updated results are as:  
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All updated TPs are greater than 𝑇𝑃𝑡 (0.1). The PIC insertion process is done.   
The node with minimum signal transition probability in CUT without PIC and 
CUT with 2-level PIC is 𝑛12 and 𝑛3, respectively. Assume that the rare signal in node 
with minimum transition probability is used as HT trigger signal. Then, the average 















− 1 ≈ 1.8 ∗ 1019  











− 1 ≈ 4  
for CUT with 2-level PIC. Simulation results are listed in Table 2.5, where CUT is 64-
bit binary comparator; delay is circuit critical path worst delay; power is average power 
consumption when PIC is off (in dormant mode); circuit size is estimated by number of 
transistors; time stands for average time to active HT when input signal is at frequency 
of 1GHz. 
Table 2.5 Performance of CUT and PIC 
 CUT 
CUT with 1-level PI CUT with 2-level PI 
Parameter Overhead Parameter Overhead 
Delay (ps) 712 840 18% 940 32% 
Power (mW) 12.78 12.78 0% 12.8 0.2% 
Size 1314 1434 1.5% 1414 7.6% 
Time 570 years 256 ns 100% 4 ns 100% 
 
As shown in Table 2.5, CUT with 1-level PI has the same improvement on HT 
activation time compared to CUT with 2-level PI, however consumes almost half delay 
overhead. Then 64-bit binary comparator with 1-level PI is chosen as the final modified 
circuit. As seen, for the idlest node in original CUT that may take 570years to active 
HT, the PIC insertion can even reduce the activation time to 256ns. It can be claimed 
that the proposed PIC has ability to modify all nodes in CUT having an acceptable 
signal transition probability. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
A novel design (PIC) is introduced to increase transition probability of idle node 
on chip that may be used as HT trigger signal. It may benefit HT detection by reducing 
the HT activation time. 64-bit binary comparator is used to evaluate the effectiveness 




3 Timing Analysis-based Hardware Trojan Detection 
A timing analysis-based microelectronic circuit Hardware Trojan (HT) detection 
methodology is proposed in this chapter. The detection circuit can be adopted in 
combinational and sequential microelectronic circuits. The proposed technique is 
implemented in IBM 90nm CMOS process and Xilinx ISE FPGA. Based on 
experimental results, with one detection circuit embedded in testing-path, a HT with 
size that is 2.81% of host-circuit size (15.63% of testing-path size) is detectable at 
detection probability of 90% with a 10% probability of a false positives. Both detectable 
HT size and detection probability can be improved by adding more detection circuits to 
testing-path. The probability of false positives is controlled by the test clock period. 
The discussion in this chapter is substantially drawn from [36][37], where we first 
reported the development and evaluation of this technique. 
3.1 Introduction 
Recently, HT detection based on timing analysis has arisen as a popular technique. 
Embedded HT will add extra capacitance, resulting in more charging and discharging 
delays to Trojan affected paths. HT can be revealed by measuring the differential timing 
characteristics of the attacked circuit. 
Most publications based on timing analysis techniques focus on algorithms to 
distinguish the timing difference caused by HT and methods to augment this difference. 
Authors in [26] chose many clean (free of HTs) ICs and run a variety of input patterns 
to record specific path delays establishing key delay fingerprints. Afterwards, circuit-
under-test (CUT) is tested under the same input patterns and verified by comparing 
timing parameters with genuine fingerprint. Due to the complexity of millions of paths 
in a complicated chip and instability of golden standards caused by inter and intra-die 
variations, this method becomes infeasible for large circuit designs. 
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Instead of comparing with genuine fingerprint, authors in [38] compare the delay 
of testing-paths with a set of symmetric paths, which are other paths that have the same 
topology as the testing-paths. The delay of testing-paths and symmetric paths will be 
the same unless an inserted HT breaks symmetry. Symmetry can naturally exist in ICs 
or be artificially added. This method can avoid the difficulty and cost in finding a golden 
model for all ICs with variable parameters. However, the detection accuracy suffers 
from intra-die parameter variation, and the detection method is limited in that huge 
area-overhead may emerge due to a bulk of artificial symmetries are required. Also, 
massive effort is accumulated in finding existing symmetric paths and the specific test 
vectors to measure desired path delays. 
Authors in [39] increase the system clock frequency to create clock glitches until 
resulting in faulty operation. Then the delay of IC critical paths for several bits are 
estimated with the faulted outputs and the corresponding clock frequency. The 
simulated path delays are compared to golden parameters to ascertain security reliability. 
Statistical analysis method is introduced in [40] to facilitate the identification of HT. A 
test-vector selection scheme and a novel timing measurement structure proposed in [41] 
are effective in accurate path-delay measurement. 
In [42], a HT detection method based on physical unclonable function (PUF) is 
proposed, as shown in Fig. 3.1. It is used to detect HT in register-to-register paths. The 
registers (FF1, FF2) in main circuit are triggered by the main system clock (clk1). HT 
detection circuitry is within the dotted box, and the register in it (FF3) is triggered by 
a shadow clock (clk2), which has the same frequency with main system clock (clk1) 
and a controlled negative shift. The negative shift of shadow clock makes FF3 to be 
triggered earlier than FF2, thereby output of combinational circuit arrives comparator 
through FF3 ahead of it through FF2. Then the shadow clock negative shift is increased 
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until the register outputs are unequal. That clock shift time is claimed to be the 
combinational circuit delay. The combinational circuit is suspicious of being HT-
attacked if the measured delay is substantially different from the pre-determined 
designed timing. This technique is at-speed detection, which can be applied at both test-
time and run-time, but it requires extra circuit with large over-head to control skewed 














Fig. 3.1 Block Diagram of HT Detection Circuit Using PUF 
A modified timing analysis-based HT detection technique is proposed in this 
chapter, in which the clock skew control circuit is eliminated to simplify the detection 
circuit. The experimental results show that the HT detection circuit overhead is 
competitive compared to state-of-the-art with similar detection probability. The main 
contributions of this technique are as follows:  
• HT detection circuit area, timing, and power overhead on host-circuit are reduced. 
The proposed detection circuit operates with main system clock, so the specific 
clock skew control circuit (normally with thousands of gates) for HT detection is 
eliminated. 
• The proposed HT detection technique is not restricted to be applications with 
register-to-register paths (e.g., [39][42]). This technique can be used on any 
circuit path by isolating the path with extra registers. 
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• Location of HT can be estimated. The detection signals of each HT testing-path 
are read out in series. The path of suspected HT can be determined by the location 
of abnormal detection signal. 
• Tunable detection probability to accommodate different security requirements of 
circuit designs. HT detection probability can be increased by more detection 
circuits pairing with one testing-path, meanwhile detection circuit overhead is 
increased. The selection of testing-path paired with one detection circuit is 
determined by chip designer based on vulnerability of the path, desired HT 
resistance, and limitations on parameter overhead. For example, the security-
sensitive portion of circuit (e.g., memory) is required to be covered by more 
detection circuits to achieve more accurate HT detection. Memory circuit is 
security-sensitive, because the key data stored in memory could be a target for 
attackers. While security-robust portion of circuit (e.g., critical path) can be 
covered by less (or even zero) detection circuits to reduce workload and circuit 
overhead. Critical path is security-robust, because any extra connection on critical 
path will slow chip operating frequency, that can be easily revealed in post-fab 
functional test. 
3.2 Timing Analysis-based HT Detection 
This section introduces the timing analysis-based HT detection algorithm, 
functional block diagram and a sub-circuit design. To simplify the introduction of 
detection algorithm, all cases in this section assume no manufacturing or environmental 
variations, and experimental results are based on schematic simulation with tt (typical-
typical) corner. The effect of operating variations is considered in section 3.3. 
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3.2.1 Timing Analysis-based HT Detection Algorithm 
In order to avoid detection, typically HTs are designed staying dormant until 
activation. The proposed detection technique algorithm and implementation are with 
premise that the HT remains dormant (sleeping mode) during detection process. 
An HT circuit embedded in testing-path will add extra capacitance, resulting in 
more charging and discharging delays to the testing-path [43][44]. The delay time (time 
from applying an input pattern to signal arriving at output) will be increased for a HT-
attacked CUT compared to HT-free CUT due to the additional delay caused by HT 
circuit. The input and output signals of testing-path with/without Trojan are shown in 
Fig. 3.2, where 𝑡𝑐 is the designed delay of the testing-path. The proposed detection 
method compares output signal at the calibrated CUT delay time (𝑡𝑐) and at double of 
the calibrated CUT delay time (2𝑡𝑐) to facilitate HT detection. For ideal case, signal 
arrives output at time 𝑡𝑐 in HT-free CUT, and the output signal remains fixed until 
time 2𝑡𝑐 with assumption that input is unchanged, so the output at time 𝑡𝑐 and 2𝑡𝑐 
are equal. In HT-attacked CUT, due to the increased delay caused by HT, signal arrives 
at the output after a time greater than 𝑡𝑐, so the output at time 𝑡𝑐 and 2𝑡𝑐 are unequal. 
 
Fig. 3.2 Signals in Trojan-Free (TF) and Trojan-Attacked (TA) Testing-Path 
The flowchart of timing analysis-based HT detection algorithm consists of five 
steps, as shown in Fig. 3.3. Based on circuit simulation, the delay time of Trojan-free 
CUT testing-path is measured as D, which is used as golden reference (calibrated delay 
time). Then input of testing-path is scanned in, and output at time D and 2D is captured 
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as signal O1 and O2, respectively. If signal O1 and O2 are same, the CUT is Trojan-free; 
otherwise, the CUT is Trojan-attacked. Because of manufacturing and environmental 
variations, the delay time of fabricated CUTs will have a statistical deviation from the 
ideal calibrated delay time of testing-path. Therefore, detection probability suffers from 
manufacturing and environmental variations, that must be considered in the 
implementation of HT detection. The implementation result of manufacturing and 
environmental-aware HT detection is introduced in section 3.4. 
Start
1. Measure circuit delay time D
2. Apply input signal
3. Capture output after time D as signal O
4. Capture output after time 2D as signal O








Fig. 3.3 Timing Analysis-based HT Detection Algorithm 
Furthermore, a ring-oscillator can be introduced to estimate operation 
temperature and process variation of individual testing-path in CUT, so that the golden 
reference time D can be calibrated for each testing-path to benefit HT detection 
probability. The use of ring-oscillator in the detection process will be discussed in 
section 3.3.2. 
3.2.2 Timing Analysis-based HT Detection Block Diagram 
As shown in Fig. 3.4, the proposed HT detection block diagram includes CUT 
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block (testing-path) and Detection Circuit block. Detection Circuit block represents HT 
detection circuit, consisting of flip-flops (FF1 & FF2), a pass transistor Switch, XOR 
gate, and feedback-AND-OR gate (FAO). The specification and design of FAO are 




















Fig. 3.4 HT Detection Block Diagram 
For HT detection in combinational circuit (testing-path 1 in Fig. 3.5), flip-flops 
(FF1 & FF2) are added to extract testing-path for further measurement. For HT 
detection in testing-path adjacent to flip-flop in sequential circuit (testing-path 2 & 3 in 
Fig. 3.5), detection circuit may share flip-flop with CUT. For example, detection circuit 
on testing-path 2 in Fig. 3.5 can use FF3 in CUT as FF1, while detection circuit on 
testing-path 3 can use FF4 and FF5 in CUT as FF1 and FF2. Compared to the timing 
analysis-based design in [42], overhead of the proposed HT detection circuit is 
benefited from removing skewed clock (clk2 in Fig. 3.1), which requires 6469 gates for 
clock control circuit. The main system clock is shared by all detection circuits in CUT. 
To work functionally, clock frequency in detection circuit is dependent on the 
corresponding testing-path. So only one testing-path is detected in one clock cycle with 
a specific clock frequency. The size of a testing-path is proportional to the size of 
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detectable HT in the testing-path. More HT detection circuits applied on one testing-
path will increase detection probability, meanwhile resulting in more circuit over-head. 
The selection and size of testing path are determined by chip designer and testing 
engineer based on HT resistance to detection, the required HT detection probability, 
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Fig. 3.5 Testing-Path in CUT 
The timing details of input and output waveforms for the proposed HT detection 
applying on circuit in Fig. 3.4 is shown in Fig. 3.6. Signal propagation time of a testing-
path is measured as time D. The off-chip system clock period is set up as 2D. As seen 
in Fig. 3.6, when detection starts, a rising edge input signal is scanned in; at next clock 
positive edge (labelled as time t1), output of FF1 (node n1) captures the input rising. 
The remaining circuit operations consider two cases: 1) Trojan-free, and 2) Trojan-
attacked. 
1) Trojan-free circuit 
In Trojan-free circuit, as shown in Fig. 3.6 (a), both n3 and O1 are pulled up 
to ‘1’ at time D after input changes. FAO gate initializes when inputs are both ‘1’ 
or ‘0’, then functions as either an OR gate when output is ‘1’ or an AND gate when 
output is ‘0’. The implementation of FAO is introduced in next section. Afterwards, 
at the clock falling edge (labelled as time t2), two inputs of FAO (𝑐𝑙𝑘̅̅ ̅̅  & 𝑛1) are 
both ‘1’, so output of FAO raises to ‘1’ and signal n2 falls to ‘0’ turn off SWITCH. 
The detection circuit is designed so that signal propagation from n3 to O1 is faster 
than that from clk to n2, then O1 rises before turning off SWITCH. Because FAO 
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gate functions as an OR gate when output is ‘1’, if one input of FAO (n1) remains 
‘1’, the output of FAO gate will be ‘1’ regardless of another input (𝑐𝑙𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ), eventually 
SWITCH remains off. Signal n3 transfers to O2 through FF2 at next clock rising 
edge (labelled as time t3). The detection result, which is equal to O1⨁O2, remains 






























Fig. 3.6 Operation Waveform of HT Detection in Corner TT (typical-typical), (a) 
Trojan-Free (TF), (b) Trojan-Attacked (TA) 
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2) Trojan-attacked circuit 
In Trojan-attacked circuit, extra time is required to charge the HT capacitor 
that is interfaced to testing-path. As shown in Fig. 3.6 (b), signal n3 is pulled up to 
‘1’ at time 𝑡2′ which is later than t2. Because SWITCH is turned off at time t2, 
signal O1 cannot capture n3 changes, and stays low. Signal O2 captures n3 through 
FF2 at the succeeding clock rising edge (time t3). The detection result is pulled to 
‘1’ at time t3. 
After HT detection takes place, the detection result is read out by a scan-chain 
that connects to detection result of all detection circuits in CUT. Then off-chip system 
clock frequency is adjusted for next testing-path. This method can detect one testing-
path with one clock period. 
The testing-path delay times will vary due to manufacturing and environmental 
variations. The effect of these variations will be considered in section 3.3 with the 
introduction of a probability of detecting an HT. 
3.2.3 FAO Gate Implementation 
FAO gate consists of two inputs (A & B), one output (?̅?), and it can be initiated 
by applying inputs both ‘1’ or both ‘0’, then output ?̅? is ’1’ or ‘0’, respectively. As 
design specification, the function of FAO gate after initiation is represented by (3.1) 
?̅? = {
𝐴 ∙ 𝐵, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 ?̅? = 0
𝐴 + 𝐵,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 ?̅? = 1
   (3.1) 
FAO transistor level design and paths operation are shown in Fig. 3.7 and Table 
3.1, respectively. Output ?̅? is uncertain before initiation. When inputs are “11”, pull-
down-path T7, T8 is on, output ?̅? is initiated to ‘1’; when inputs are “00”, pull-up-path 
T3, T2, T1/T4 is on, output ?̅? is initiated to ‘0’. As seen in Table 3.1, FAO functions 
as either an AND gate when ‘?̅?’ is ‘0’, or an OR gate when ‘?̅?’ is ‘1’. This design can 
work as AND or OR gate that is dependent on circuit output signal, therefore the 
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Fig. 3.7 Feedback-AND-OR (FAO) Gate 
Table 3.1 Paths Operation in FAO Gate 
Current Output Input Next Output 
Path On 
?̅? A B ?̅? 
0 
0 0 0 T1/T4, T2/T5, T3/T6 
0 1 0 T4, T5, T3/T6 
1 0 0 T1, T2/T5, T6 
1 1 1 T7, T8 
1 
0 0 0 T1/T4, T2, T3 
0 1 1 T9, T10 
1 0 1 T11, T12 
1 1 1 T7, T8 / T9, T10 / T11, T12 
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3.2.4 Deployment of Timing Analysis-based HT Detection 
There are several ways to categorize HT, such as categorizations based on 
physical, activation, action, location characterization [4]. This section introduces HT 
categorization based on location of HT, which can significantly vary the effect of HT 














Fig. 3.8 HT Location in CUT, (a) In-Path, (b) By-Path, (c) Off-Path 
Based on location characteristics of Trojan in host-circuit, Trojan is partitioned 
into three categories: in-path, by-path, and off-path, as shown in Fig. 3.8. When input 
pattern is applied, the location of HT plays an important role on the ability to detect it. 
The propagation signal in CUT will go through the extra paths caused by in-path HT, 
which affects the measured transient time for some extend. The chip’s function can be 
changed by an in-path HT through adding additional logic or bypassing the original 
logic. A by-path HT affects the CUT’s original path by capacitive load introduced by 
the HT, which affects the measured transient time for much less extend. A by-path HT 
may be used to transit IC internal information to the attacker. Off-path HT is isolated 
from the original circuit path, resulting in negligible timing alteration on original signal 
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propagation. An off-path HT may be used to tremendously change circuit temperature, 
eventually modify the chip’s parametric properties, such as delay and power [5]. 
Although by-path and off-path HT has relatively tiny effect on path timing parameter, 
HT’s control and action logic add extra Trojan circuit to the host-chip that will consume 
extra power compared to original design. The detection of this type of Trojan is under 
study based on combinational of power and timing-analysis in chapter 5. The proposed 
method in this chapter is introduced for in-path and by-path HT detection. 
3.3 Schematic Implementation 
The HT detection circuit is implemented in Cadence Schematic with IBM 90nm 
CMOS process. Monte Carlo analysis is used to account for operating variations. 
The proposed HT detection method is implemented on 4, 8, 16-bit ripple-carry-
adders (RCAs) with in-path and by-path HTs, respectively. Signal n1 and n3 in Fig. 3.4 
are carry-in (Cin) and carry-out (Cout) of RCA, respectively. Input vector of CUT is set 
as Cout rises with Cin rising. 
3.3.1 Operating Variation-Aware HT Detection 
For ideal case, the circuit delay time will be increased (greater than 𝑡𝑐) for a HT-
attacked CUT compared to HT-free CUT due to the additional delay caused by HT 
circuit, shown in Fig. 3.2, so the output at time 𝑡𝑐 and 2𝑡𝑐 are unequal. However, in 
actual case, because of manufacturing process variation, circuit delay time varies in a 
range, as shown in Fig. 3.9, in which the actual circuit delay varies in the range labelled 
as from min to max. Increasing circuit calibrated delay time 𝑡𝑐 will cover more delay 
cases in Trojan-free case that decreases HT detection false positive (FP), meanwhile 
increased 𝑡𝑐  may miss more delays in Trojan-attacked case that decreases HT 
detection probability. Also, as shown in Table 3.2, decreased 𝑡𝑐  will increase both 
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detection FP and detection probability. Note that false positive is the fault that asserts 











Fig. 3.9 Ideal Signals in Trojan-Free (TF) and Trojan-Attacked (TA) Testing Path 
Table 3.2 HT Detection Parameters with Variable Calibrated Delay Time 
𝑡𝑐 False Positive Detection Probability 
Increased Decreased Decreased 
Decreased Increased Increased 
 
To find the relationship of circuit fan-out and circuit timing alteration caused by 
operating variation, an experimentation is set up as follows. Ten inverters connected in 
serial, shown in Fig. 3.10 (a), is used as CUT with fan-out 1, while extra number of n-
1 inverters connected to each interval node, shown in Fig. 3.10 (b), is used as CUT with 
fan-out n. The experimental results are listed in Table 3.3, in which ideal delay is based 
on schematic simulation with tt (typical-typical) corner; actual delay is based on 
schematic simulation with Monte Carlo analysis (100 iterations) to account for random 
process variation and mismatch. As seen, the actual delay variation is decreased with 
number of circuit fan-out increasing. Because it is rare that all fan-outs succeeding a 
component pushing its process variation to limitation at the same direction. Therefore, 
we claim that more fan-outs in a circuit design lead to low operating parameter 
alteration associated with process variation, eventually benefit HT detection probability, 
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Fig. 3.10 CUT with fan-out 1 (a), and fan-out n (b) 
 





1 133.87 105.84-174.01 29.98% 
2 203.87 158.96-249.47 22.37% 
3 275.14 221.92-329.87 19.89% 
4 347.87 284.43-408.86 18.24% 
5 421.02 355.48-489.70 16.31% 
 
To prove that circuit with more fan-outs benefit HT detection probability, the 
proposed timing analysis-based HT detection method is applied on a CUT (16-bit 
ripple-carry-adder) with different number of fan-outs. Inverters are used connecting to 
intermediate nodes to account for extra fan-outs. The experimental results are shown in 
Table 3.4, in which HT detection is at detection probability of 90% with a 10% 
probability of a false positives; the sum of widths of all NMOS and PMOS in circuit is 
used to estimate circuit size. As seen, circuit with increased number of fan-outs possess 
lower delay variation and ability to detect HT with smaller size that means detection 
probability is increased. 
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Actual Delay Variation HT/Host-Circuit Size Ratio 
1 170 28.73% 2.81% 
2 173.84 27.62% 2.73% 
3 177.68 27.15% 2.68% 
4 181.52 26.87% 2.66% 
5 185.36 26.51% 2.59% 
 
3.3.2 Compensation of Manufacturing and Environmental Variations 
Authors in [45] indicate that manufacturing and environmental variations can 
cause up to 30% circuit performance difference. Also, the increased logic density and 
operation frequency of modern ICs have exponentially magnified operational variations 
due to temperature fluctuations. The increased temperature reduces transistor switching 
speed, while increases transistor leakage current, that increases chip power 
consumption and propagation delay. 
To compensate these effects of variation on HT detection, a ring-oscillator, whose 
frequency is temperature-dependent, is used to feed a counter, as shown in Fig. 3.11 
[46]. The counter output can be read out to estimate ring-oscillator frequency. If the 
ring-oscillator is layout-close to a testing-path, the environmental variations of testing-
path circuit can be estimated using ring-oscillator frequency. Then the calibrated delay 
signature of the testing-path considering environmental variations may be used to 




Fig. 3.11 Ring-Oscillator Scheme 
This technique is overhead-effective, and benefits detection probability in 
individual testing-path in CUT. Due to the limitation of simulation tools, the ring-
oscillator is not implemented, but is introduced as a potential method to optimize the 
detection probability. 
3.3.3 In-Path HT Detection 
HT occupying CUT path is defined as in-path HT, as shown in Fig. 3.8 (a). The 
HT detection probability and detectable HT size in CUT are discussed in this section. 
3.3.3.1 HT/Host-Circuit Ratio 
To find how the size of testing-path will affect detection probability, a single 
detection circuit is applied on three CUTs with different size (4, 8, 16-bit RCA). To 
determine the calibrated circuit delay, flip-flops are added to input and output of the 
RCA to find the maximum clock frequency of flip-flops while the RCA continues to 
work functionally. Inverter buffers are randomly embedded in CUT testing-path to 
account for HT. Both HT-free and HT-attacked CUTs are simulated by Monte Carlo 
analysis (100 iterations) to account for random process variation and mismatch. The 






Fig. 3.12 Detection of RCAs with In-Path HT, (a) 4-Bit, (b) 8-Bit, (c) 16-Bit RCA 
False positive (FP) in Fig. 3.12 is the fault that asserts Trojan-attacked for a 
Trojan-free circuit (false alarm). The probability of a FP in a Trojan-free circuit is 
largely controlled by 𝑓𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘. Increasing clock frequency constrains signal propagation 
time from input to output of a test circuit. As clock frequency increases, measuring the 
test circuit output at half the clock period and one clock period is more likely to produce 
conflicting results thereby increasing the probability of a FP. Each test result is based 
on averaging 100 Monte Carlo run and it turns out that probability of FP is essentially 
constant for a given clock frequency. As seen in Fig. 3.12 (a) the probability of a FP is 
0% if the clock frequency is equal to or less than 1.19GHz regardless of the HT size. 
As clock frequency increases, the probability of FP increases, resulting in the plots of 
the FP probability of 0, 10%, 20%, and 30%. On the other hand, a false negative (FN) 
(100%-detection probability) is the fault that asserts Trojan-free for a Trojan-attacked 
circuit. For a given clock frequency the probability of a FN is dependent on the relative 
size of the HT compared to the test circuit size. As expected, the probability of a FN 
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decreases with HT size that is supported by the results in Fig. 3.12 where each result is 
an average of 100 Monte Carlo runs. Each contour in Fig. 3.12 represents the 
probability of a FN given a fixed FP. It is noted that 100%-FN% is the probability of 
detecting the HT given a FP. For example, a 90% probability of detecting a HT given a 
10% probability of a FP (asserting an HT when none is present) corresponds to FN and 
FP being equal to 10%. The data in Table 3.5 has been extracted from the Fig. 3.12 plots 
for equal values of FN and FP noting that 100%-FN% is the detection probability for a 
given FP. The “Area overhead” in Table 3.5 is the size ratio of detection circuit over 
CUT. The same detection circuit is applied to all three RCAs (input to output of 4, 8, or 
16-bit RCA), but the total size of the RCA essentially doubles from 4 to 8 to 16-bits, so 
the area overhead decreases with the number of bits. Longer signal propagation path 
requires more transfer time, so the clock frequency for a given FP decreases and the HT 
size for a given detection probability increases with the number of bits in RCA. 













4-Bit RCA 14.04% 
100% 0% 1.19 2.88 6.74% 
90% 10% 1.32 1.44 3.37% 
80% 20% 1.35 0.96 2.25% 
70% 30% 1.39 0.48 1.13% 
8-Bit RCA 7.03% 
100% 0% 0.6 4.8 5.62% 
90% 10% 0.65 2.88 3.37% 
80% 20% 0.67 1.92 2.25% 
70% 30% 0.69 1.44 1.69% 
16-Bit 3.51% 100% 0% 0.31 8.16 5.89% 
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RCA 90% 10% 0.33 4.8 2.81% 
80% 20% 0.34 4.32 2.53% 
70% 30% 0.35 1.92 1.12% 
 
To summarize, this detection technique facilitates essentially controlling the 
probability of FP (false alarm) with the test circuit clock frequency while the probability 
of detection is controlled by the relative size of HT to the test circuit size. 
3.3.3.2 HT/Testing-Path Ratio 
Path delay is the time from a path-input transition to a path-output transition. Path 
delay is caused by capacitance in the signal propagation path which cannot be charged 
or discharged instantaneously [47]. Signal propagates in circuit by switching the CMOS 
networks on and off, charging and discharging each node capacitors through the entire 
path. HT increases the circuit path delay by adding extra capacitance in testing-path. 
The extra capacitance on testing-path caused by HT is denoted as HT on-path 
capacitance. An important parameter affecting HT detection accuracy is the ratio of 
detectable HT on-path capacitance to testing-path total capacitance. 
Gate capacitance is used to estimate the size of both HT capacitance and CUT 
capacitance. The capacitance at each node consists of driving load and self-load. Both 
loads are proportional to the transistor width [48]. Then the sum of widths of all NMOS 
and PMOS on testing-path is used to estimate circuit capacitance on testing-path for 
both CUT and HT. The detectable HT size and testing-path size at detection probability 
90% is listed in Table 3.6. The Testing-Path Size in Table 3.6 is the sum of widths of 
transistors in CUT that directly interfaced to testing-path. The HT On-Path Size in Table 
3.6 is the sum of widths of transistors in HT that directly connected to testing-path. As 
seen, detectable HT size is proportional to testing-path size. 
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Table 3.6 Detectable In-Path HT/Testing-Path Size at 90% Detection Probability 
CUT Testing-Path Size (μm) HT On-Path Size (μm) HT/Testing-Path Ratio 
4-Bit RCA 7.68 1.44 18.75% 
8-Bit RCA 15.36 2.88 18.75% 
16-Bit RCA 30.72 4.8 15.63% 
 
As seen in Table 3.6, the detectable HT size ratio fluctuates in range of 15.63-
18.75%. In order to provide a practical detectable HT size ratio, Linear Regression [49] 
is applied to find the best linear equation expressing from data in Table 3.6 and predict 
the detectable Trojan size with known testing path size. We use 𝑇0, 𝑇1, 𝑇2  and 
𝑃0, 𝑃1, 𝑃2 to represent detectable HT size and testing-path size in the three RCAs 





2 𝑃0 + 𝑃1 + 𝑃2
𝑃0 + 𝑃1 + 𝑃2 3
]         (3.2) 
𝑏0 = [
𝑃0𝑇0 + 𝑃1𝑇1 + 𝑃2𝑇2
𝑇0 + 𝑇1 + 𝑇2
]            (3.3) 
𝑥∗ = 𝑄−1𝑏0 = [
0.1429
0.48
]         (3.4) 
So 
T = [𝑃 1] ∗ 𝑥∗ = 0.1429P + 0.48       (3.5) 
where detectable HT size is T, detecting-path size is P. Equation (3.5) and the three 
data points in Table 3.6 used in Linear Regression are plotted in Fig. 3.13. As seen, the 
straight-line virtually cross origin of coordinates, so the slope of the straight line can be 
used to estimate the ratio of detectable HT/testing-path size. Then we can claim that a 
HT with size greater than 14.29% of HT-connected propagation path size can be 
detected by the proposed detection methodology. 
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Fig. 3.13 Detectable In-Path HT/Testing-Path Size 
Note that more detection circuit applied on a testing-path will decrease detectable 
Trojan size. Also, as discussed in section 3.3.2, the operation analysis of additional ring-
oscillator has potential to improve the implemented detection probability, or on the 
other hand, can reduce the detection circuit over-head at the same detection probability. 
3.3.4 By-Path HT Detection 
A by-path HT occurs when the HT is not embedded in a CUT path but wired to a 
path node which is depicted in Fig. 3.8 (b). The HT detection probability and detectable 
HT size are discussed in this section for the case of a CUT with by-path HT. 
3.3.4.1 HT/Host-Circuit Ratio 
The extra propagation time caused by the by-path HT capacitive load directly 
connected to CUT testing-path is usually small. Instead of measuring timing parameter 
alteration of whole host-circuit, the proposed work measures the timing difference of 
specific testing-path. Then the timing difference made by HT is more obvious, and 
detection probability can be controlled by length of CUT testing-path paired with one 
detection circuit. More HT detection circuits on a testing-path will increase the 
55 
detection probability. 
4, 8, 16-bit RCAs are used as CUT to implement by-path HT detection. Inverters 
are randomly connected to nodes on the testing-path to account for by-path HT load to 
CUT. Both Trojan-free and Trojan-attacked CUTs are simulated using Monte Carlo 
analysis (100 iterations) to account for random process variation and mismatch. The 
detection results of Trojan-attacked CUTs are shown in Fig. 3.14. As seen, with the 
clock frequency corresponding to the same FP, HT detection probability is proportional 
to Trojan size. The Trojan size is in term of the sum of widths of all NMOS and PMOS 
transistors in HT that directly interfaced to the CUT. CUT with larger size requires 
Trojan with larger size to achieve the same detection probability. The data in Table 3.7 
has been extracted from the Fig. 3.14 plots for equal values of FN and FP noting that 






Fig. 3.14 Detection of RCAs with By-Path HT, (a) 4-Bit, (b) 8-Bit, (c) 16-Bit RCA 
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FP HT Size (μm) HT/Host-Circuit Ratio 
4-Bit 
RCA 
100% 0% 3.6 8.42% 
90% 10% 1.68 3.93% 
80% 20% 1.2 2.81% 
70% 30% 0.72 1.68% 
8-Bit 
RCA 
100% 0% 6.24 7.30% 
90% 10% 3.84 4.49% 
80% 20% 2.88 3.37% 
70% 30% 1.68 1.97% 
16-Bit 
RCA 
100% 0% 9.84 7.68% 
90% 10% 5.76 4.49% 
80% 20% 4.56 3.56% 
70% 30% 2.4 1.87% 
 
3.3.4.2 HT/Testing-Path Ratio 
As aforementioned, sum of transistor widths is used to estimate circuit size in this 
chapter. The testing-path size and the minimum detectable HT size at detection 
probability 90% are listed in Table 3.8. As seen, detectable HT size is proportional to 
testing-path size. Note that, the implementation result has potential to be improved by 
ring-oscillator. The HT/testing-path ratio in Table 3.8 is greater than that in the in-path 
HT detection in Table 3.6. By-path HT is harder to detect compared to in-path HT. 
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Table 3.8 Detectable By-Path HT/Testing-Path Size at 90% Detection Probability 
CUT Testing-Path Size (μm) HT On-Path Size (μm) HT/Testing-Path Ratio 
4-Bit RCA 7.68 1.68 21.9% 
8-Bit RCA 15.36 3.84 25% 
16-Bit RCA 30.72 5.76 18.75% 
 
 
Fig. 3.15 Detectable By-Path HT/Testing-Path Size 
As seen in Table 3.8, the detectable HT size ratio fluctuates in range of 18.75-
25%. To predict a practical detectable HT size with known testing-path size, equation 
(3.2)(3.3)(3.4) are used to achieve Linear Regression function of detectable by-path 
HT/testing-path size ratio, as  
T = [𝑃 1] ∗ 𝑥∗ = 0.1696P + 0.72       (3.6) 
where detectable by-path HT size is T, detecting-path size is P. Equation (3.6) and the 
three data points in Table 3.8 used in Linear Regression are plotted in Fig. 3.15. The 
straight-line slope is used to estimate the ratio of detectable by-path HT/testing-path 
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size, thereby we can claim that a by-path HT with size greater than 16.96% of HT-
connected propagation path size can be detected by the proposed detection methodology. 
3.3.5 Power-Overhead Analysis 
The proposed detection technique will only be conducted off-line in conjunction 
with functionality/reliability testing with emphasis on detection of HT inserted during 
fabrication. The additional power consumed by the detection circuit in field would be 
determined with the detection circuitry in passive (sleeping) mode. Then for detection 
circuit power overhead measurement, the CUT is active while HT detection circuit is 
dormant. To find power-overhead of the proposed detection circuit, a power 
measurement experimentation is set up as follows. 4, 8, 16-bit RCAs are used as CUT, 
respectively. Power consumption of CUT is measured when CUT operates at frequency 
of 100MHz. Power consumption of CUT with detection circuit is measured when CUT 
operates at same frequency of 100MHz while detection circuit is dormant. Detection 
circuit in dormant mode will only consume static power. The static power consumption 
of the same single detection circuit is fixed regardless of the size of corresponding CUT. 
Therefore, power-overhead of detection circuit is inverse-proportional to the size of 
CUT. The power measurement results are shown in Table 3.9. As seen, the power 
consumption overhead of detection circuit is 1.2-3.7%, which is inverse-proportional 
to the corresponding CUT size. Power consumption of detection circuits in 4, 8, 16-bit 
RCAs are 0.8W, 0.91W, 0.9W, respectively. All the three RCAs are paired with the 
same detection circuit. However, due to the different signals applied to detection circuit 
by CUT testing path (signal n1 and n3 in Fig. 3.4), the detection circuit is in different 
static power states thereby causing static power consumptions of detection circuit in 
CUTs are slightly different. 
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Table 3.9 Power Consumption of CUT & HT Detection Circuit 
CUT 
Power Consumption (W) 
Power Overhead 
CUT CUT & Detection Circuit 
4-Bit RCA 21.52 22.32 3.7% 
8-Bit RCA 39.85 40.76 2.3% 
16-Bit RCA 74.12 75.02 1.2% 
 
3.4 Xilinx Implementation 
An 8-bit digital finite impulse response filter (FIR) with order of 12 is 
implemented in FPGA as CUT for HT detection experiment [50]. Digital FIR, shown 
in Fig. 3.16, is a filter whose impulse response is of finite duration, because it settles to 
zero in finite time. Each value of the output sequence is a weighted sum of the most 
recent input values: 
𝑦[𝑛] = ∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑥[𝑛 − 𝑖]
𝑁
𝑖=0        (3.7) 
where 𝑥[𝑛] is input, 𝑦[𝑛] is output, N is filter order, 𝑏𝑖 is filter coefficient [51]. 
 
Fig. 3.16 Digital FIR Filter of Order n 
The critical path of FIR is used as the HT testing-path. The XC6VLX240T FPGA 
board, shown in Fig. 3.17, is deployed in this experimentation. FPGA internal signal 
writing and reading are conducted using ChipScope, whose organization diagram is 
shown in Fig. 3.18. A clock at 200MHz frequency is generated by Phase Locked Loop 
(PLL) on board, then it is converted to required filter clock by Digital Clock Manager 
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(DCM). Integrated Controller (ICON) communicates with the host PC and sends 
commands to other ChipScope modules via a control port. The Virtual Input/Output 
(VIO) core is customized to drive a pulse train of successive values for CUT input 
signal. CUT input, CUT output and HT-detection signals on FPGA are monitored and 
send for display by Integrated Logic Analyzer (ILA) core. 
 
Fig. 3.17 FPGA Board (XC6VLX240T) 
 
Fig. 3.18 FPGA ChipScope Organization 
The implementation results of FPGA, shown in Fig. 3.19, match the detection 
















algorithm: the detection signal remains low for Trojan-free CUT at second clock rising 




Fig. 3.19 FPGA Implementation Result of FIR Filter 
Fabricated circuit operating variations include process, voltage, and temperature 
(PVT) variation. To account for effect PVT variation on HT detection parameters, the 
HT detection method is implemented on ten FPGA boards. The implementation results 
are listed in Table 3.10, in which FPGA boards are ordered by CUT delay time. To 
achieve 10% FP (false alarm) for Trojan-free circuit, CUT clock period is set up as 
double of the ninth CUT delay (4.9ns), so that FPGA 1-9 can be correctly asserted to 
be Trojan-free. The eighth detectable HT size is the minimum detectable Trojan size at 
90% detection probability with 10% probability of FP. As seen in Table 3.10, an in-path 
Trojan with size 0.7% of host-circuit and 3.2% of testing-path is detectable at detection 
probability 90% with 10% false alarm. HT size ratio is less than schematic 
implementation, because the limited FPGA chips have less process variation than 
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CMOS process modelling. The system clock frequency generated by DCM on FPGA 
board is not continuous, so CUT delay and detectable HT size are not as accurate as 
Cadence schematic implementation which can generate continuous clock frequency. 














1 4.7 0.5% 2.4% 0.9% 4.3% 
2 4.7 0.5% 2.4% 0.9% 4.3% 
3 4.7 0.5% 2.4% 1.1% 5.3% 
4 4.8 0.7% 3.2% 1.1% 5.3% 
5 4.8 0.7% 3.2% 1.1% 5.3% 
6 4.8 0.7% 3.2% 1.1% 5.3% 
7 4.8 0.7% 3.2% 1.1% 5.3% 
8 4.9 0.7% 3.2% 1.2% 5.8% 
9 4.9 0.7% 3.2% 1.3% 6.2% 
10 5 0.9% 4% 1.4% 6.7% 
 
3.5 Experimental Evaluation 
This section clarifies three terms in this chapter: testing-path, host-circuit and 
host-chip. They are important in understanding the HT detection parameters. Thereafter 
benchmark circuits are used to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed detection 
method. 
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3.5.1 HT Detection Parameters 
As mentioned before, the proposed HT detection circuit is applied on a selected 
testing-path, which is a part of CUT. The host-circuit in the aforementioned detection 
implementations is defined as the circuit associated with the testing-path. A low-power 
carry-select-adder (CSA), shown in Fig. 3.20, is used to illustrate the HT detection 
parameters for Trojan associate with testing-path, host-circuit and the whole host-chip 
[52]. In this experiment, a HT circuit is randomly embedded in the testing-path, which 
is from Cin to Cout in Fig. 3.20. With detection probability of 90% and 10% probability 
of FP, the minimum detectable Trojan size is 0.24μm, which is 14.3% of the testing-
path size, 1.85% of the host-circuit size, and 0.09% of the host-chip (CSA) size. The 
testing-path size is the size summation of transistors in CUT that directly connected to 
the testing-path. The host-circuit size is the size of circuit in CUT that associate with 
the testing-path, which is the circuit in dotted box in Fig. 3.20. The host-chip size in 






















































Fig. 3.20 Low-Power Carry-Select-Adder 
The detectable Trojan size ratio in section 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 is the ratio of Trojan 
size over testing-path size or host-circuit size. Based on the implementations in section 
3.3.3 and 3.3.4, the detectable Trojan size is one or two orders smaller than testing-path 
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or host-circuit size. As discussed above, the ratio of detectable Trojan size over the 
whole host-chip size is even much less. Also, the detectable Trojan size and detection 
probability can be further improved by deploying more detection circuits on the testing-
path. For example, one detection circuit applied on the testing-path in Fig. 3.20 can 
detect Trojan with size of 0.24m at detection probability 90%. Two detection circuit 
sequentially applied on the same testing-path will either detect Trojan with size of 
0.12m at detection probability 90% or detect Trojan with size of 0.24m at detection 
probability 100%. 
As mentioned, the selection of testing path paired with one detection circuit is 
determined by chip designer and testing engineer based on HT resistance to detection, 
the required HT detection probability, the probability of false alarm, and limitations on 
parameter overhead. 
3.5.2 Experimental Result 
ISCAS-85/89 benchmarks are used to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed 
detection method. Critical paths in benchmarks are as testing-paths. Inverter buffers are 
randomly embedded in testing-path to account for HT. Multiple detection circuits are 
applied on each testing-path to achieve that the minimum detectable HT size is about 
2% of host-circuit size. Operating clock frequency and HT size are set when FN and FP 
are equal to 5%. The simulation result is shown in Table 3.11. As seen, the minimum 
detectable HT size is 1.32-3.85% of host-circuit size that is dependent on host-circuit 
design. 
Table 3.11 HT Detection Result on Benchmarks 
CUT Gate 𝒇𝒄𝒍𝒐𝒄𝒌 (GHz) HT Size (μm) HT/Host-Circuit Ratio Area Overhead 
S27 13 1.45 0.24 3.85% 3.94% 
S344 175 0.31 1.68 2.39% 2.11% 
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C499 202 0.46 2.16 2.66% 2.43% 
C6288 2406 0.14 14.4 2.28% 1.9% 
C5315 2406 0.08 20.4 1.32% 1.3% 
 
Table 3.12 lists parameters of some recently published timing analysis-based HT 
detection results. With similar detection probability, the proposed technique is 
competitive in HT detection accuracy and sensitivity with relatively low overhead. Note 
that the detectable HT size can be decreased by adding more detection circuits in one 
testing-path, but its attendant more overhead. 
Table 3.12 Comparison of HT Detection Methods 
Reference Detection Probability False Positive Detectable HT Size Area Overhead 




Ngo [39] 95% 5% 1.7%a 0 
Kelly [53] 100% 0 0.3%a 7.5% 
Nejat [41] 97% 16% 6.1%b 20% 
a minimum detectable HT size/host-chip size 
b minimum detectable HT size/host-circuit size 
3.6 Conclusion 
A novel HT detection technique based on timing analysis is proposed. The 
detection process of each testing-path takes one clock cycle. The detection method can 
be adopted in both combinational and sequential circuit. Probability of detection FP 
(false alarm) is effectively determined by the test clock frequency. For 90nm CMOS 
ASIC benchmarks, the ratio of detectable HT size over host-circuit size ranged from 
2.81% to 3.37% at 90% detection probability with 10% FP. For FPGA implementation 
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of HT detection, the ratio of detectable HT size to host-circuit size ranged from 
approximated 0.5% to 0.9% at 90% detection probability. The detectable HT size and 
detection probability can be further improved by applying more detection circuits on a 
testing-path. Also, ring-oscillator can be introduced to estimate operation temperature 
and process variation of testing-path to calibrate detection parameters, eventually 
improve detection probability. 
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4 Self-Reference-based Hardware Trojan Detection 
A self-reference-based power-analysis microelectronic circuit Hardware Trojan 
(HT) detection methodology is proposed in this chapter. Simulation results show that 
the proposed technique can detect HTs with areas that are 0.013% of the host-circuitry. 
ISCAS benchmark circuits are used to evaluate efficiency of the developed method. 
The discussion in this chapter is substantially drawn from [54][55], where we first 
reported the development and evaluation of this technique. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Recently, HT detection based on power analysis has arisen as an effective 
technique. Embedded HT will add current paths and loads to the original circuit, that 
result in extra power consumption on wires and gates in Trojan affected area. HT can 
be revealed by measuring the differential power characteristics of the attacked circuit. 
Most publications based on power analysis techniques focus on algorithms to 
distinguish the power difference caused by HT and methods to augment this difference. 
In [27], authors distinguish the HT-attacked chip by comparing the power traces of 
circuit-under-test (CUT) with genuine circuit. Statistical methods are used to improve 
the detection accuracy. This method is practical on HT with sufficient size to cause 
detectable differences, however HT is normally designed with small size to maintain 
the stealthy nature. It is difficult to directly distinguish the tiny effect of HT on a modern 
complex chip. To augment the effect of HT, authors in [56] partition circuit into regions 
using scan chains, then specific test vectors are generated to magnify the activity in the 
target region. The power trace of the CUT is compared to golden parameters to ascertain 
security reliability. Results show that the impact of HT on host-circuit is effectively 
enlarged by this method. However, due to the instability of golden standards caused by 
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inter and intra-die variations and the maskable tiny power of HT caused by intrinsic 
process and environmental variations of the host-chip, this method becomes practical 
only for relatively large HT circuit designs. In [57], authors proposed a HT detection 
method based on gate level characterization (GLC), in which a genuine-guaranteed chip 
is not required. For each gate on chip, a manufacturing variability (MV) factor is 
multiplied with ideal static power of the gate to account for MV effect on power profile. 
To achieve more accurate results, thermal condition is considered for static power 
calculation. Thereafter, a controlled input vector switching is used to adjust the thermal 
conditioning of the entire chip to an expected level. A linear equation set is formulated 
by the sum of calculated static power of each gate added a single HT variable is equal 
to the measured static power of the whole chip. The HT variable is solved by a linear 
program solver. The CUT is affirmed as Trojan-free if HT variable is close to 0; 
otherwise, it is Trojan-attacked. To increase the detection accuracy in [57], CUT is 
partitioned into segments using input vector selection in [58]. When the static power of 
a segment is measured, a set of input vectors are applied to alter the static status of the 
target segment while other segments are dormant. 
A self-reference-based Trojan detection method is proposed in this chapter, in 
which the effect of operating variations can be reduced by referencing neighbor 
elements. The experimental results show that the HT detection accuracy is competitive 
compared to state-of-the-art. 
4.2 Preliminaries 
This section introduces the basic design theory of the self-reference-based HT 
detection. 
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4.2.1 Self-Reference-based HT Detection Theory 
A sequential circuit is used as an example to explain this proposed technique. As 
shown in Fig. 4.1, a CUT is partitioned into N segments excluding the system clock-
tree. The clock-tree is an essential net-work in modern chips to distribute clock to all 
clocked elements at virtually the same time [59]. All partitioned segments in the CUT 
must be controllable by primary inputs. Each segment uses a separate power rail, and 
an on-chip clock-tree is powered by a specific rail in segment 0. To measure one 
segment static power, the voltage supply is applied to this segment along with the clock-
tree rail, while leaving the other power rails float.  
input output

















Fig. 4.1 Partitioned CUT 
Considering an integrated circuit (IC) segment q with input pattern IN, the static 
power measurement can be modeled as consisting of following components: (1) ideal 
static power of component i in q, 𝑝𝑖(𝑞, 𝐼𝑁) which is dependent on operating segment 
and input pattern. The ideal power is obtained by simulation based on tt (typical-typical) 
corner analysis; (2) operating variations (process, voltage, temperature) effect on static 
power of component i, 𝑛𝑣𝑖(𝑞, 𝐼𝑁, 𝑡) which is a random value, but it is influenced by 
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operating segment, input pattern, and operating time (t); (3) signal noise 𝑛𝑠(𝑞, 𝐼𝑁, 𝑡) 
which depends on operating segment, input pattern, and operating time; (4) extra power 
consumed by Trojan circuit 𝑝𝑇(𝑞, 𝐼𝑁, 𝑡) if segment is attacked by Trojan circuit. 
Therefore, static power measurement of Trojan-free segment q with k components can 
be modeled by (4.1)  
𝑃𝑚𝑒𝑠(𝑞, 𝐼𝑁, 𝑡) = ∑ (𝑝𝑖(𝑞, 𝐼𝑁) + 𝑛𝑣𝑖(𝑞, 𝐼𝑁, 𝑡))
𝑘
𝑖=1 + 𝑛𝑠(𝑞, 𝐼𝑁, 𝑡)    (4.1) 
and static power of the Trojan-attacked q is 
𝑃𝑚𝑒𝑠(𝑞, 𝐼𝑁, 𝑡) = ∑ (𝑝𝑖(𝑞, 𝐼𝑁) + 𝑛𝑣𝑖(𝑞, 𝐼𝑁, 𝑡))
𝑘
𝑖=1 + 𝑛𝑠(𝑞, 𝐼𝑁, 𝑡) + 𝑝𝑇(𝑞, 𝐼𝑁, 𝑡)  (4.2) 
The random signal noise 𝑛𝑠(𝑞, 𝐼𝑁, 𝑡) can be largely eliminated by averaging 
over a number of power measurements for the same IC. So signal noise is ignored in 
(4.1) and (4.2). Fabricated circuit operating variations include process, voltage, and 
temperature (PVT) variation. The same component in q will have the same process and 
voltage variation for different input pattern IN. Different IN will result in different 
power consumption and eventually vary operating temperature. A specific operating 
variable scaling factors (λ) is introduced to account for the average PVT variation on a 
circuit component compared to the ideal static power consumption. The static power of 
genuine q and Trojan-attacked q are modeled as (4.3) and (4.4), respectively. 
𝑃𝑚𝑒𝑠(𝑞, 𝐼𝑁, 𝑡) = ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑝𝑖(𝑞, 𝐼𝑁)
𝑘
𝑖=1     (4.3) 
𝑃𝑚𝑒𝑠(𝑞, 𝐼𝑁, 𝑡) = ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑝𝑖(𝑞, 𝐼𝑁) +
𝑘
𝑖=1 𝑝𝑇(𝑞, 𝐼𝑁, 𝑡)           (4.4) 
Equation (4.4) accounts for the extra Trojan power consumption, but is not used 
in the self-reference-based detection methodology. Equation (4.3) is used as power 
measurement model in the rest of this chapter. Inserting Trojan will increase power 
consumption (𝑃𝑚𝑒𝑠 ) in (4.3), meanwhile 𝑝𝑖  is fixed from tt corner simulation. 
Therefore, the λ value in Trojan-attached circuit will be increased compared to Trojan-
free circuit. 
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The proposed HT detection methodology is based on solving for each component 
λ and clock-tree λ with the pre-determined (simulated) ideal static power (𝑝𝑖) of each 
component and measured power (𝑃𝑚𝑒𝑠) of each segment with different input patterns. 
HT-attacked assertion in each segment is based on the λ𝑐𝑙𝑘 for that segment falling 
outside of prescribed limits. The prescribed limit of λ𝑐𝑙𝑘 for a specific segment is 
dependent on reference of the values of λ𝑐𝑙𝑘 in other segments of the chip. So, this 
technique is denoted as self-reference-based HT detection. 
Basically, this detection method uses a global component to estimate the 
parametric stability of each partitioned segment. The clock-tree is used as a global 
component in this chapter, since most practical chip designs including both 
combinational and sequential circuits are with a clock-tree to meet modern circuit 
requirements, high operating frequency and high resolution. For detection on 
combinational circuit only chips without clock-tree, this method needs to use other 
global circuits as reference component, such as a power-gating control circuit. 
The main contributions of this technique are as follows:  
• HT detection method can be applied with zero-overhead. 
• Genuine chip is not needed. 
• Location of HT can be estimated. 
• Partitioned CUT increases detection accuracy. 
• Detection accuracy is adjustable by size of partitioned segments.  
• Computational complexity is optimizable based on required detection accuracy.  
There is a potential I/O issue with this technique because each partitioned 
segment requires a separate pair of power rail (𝑉𝐷𝐷 , 𝐺𝑁𝐷), which occupies two I/O pins. 
So, the number of required power pins may increase with the number of partitioned 
segments. However, to have a stable power source, chip designers usually provide a 
73 
number of I/O pads for power rails. For example, in MIPS processor, 11 out of 40 I/O 
pads are used for power rails [60][61]. Then the existing power pads can be employed 
to separate power segments. Furthermore, a multiplexer can be exploited to control 
more power rails for segments with limited I/O pins. To achieve the maximum detection 
accuracy with zero overhead, all existing power pads should be exploited to separate 
power segments, that means the number of partitioned segments (N) should follow 2 ∗
𝑁 = 𝑛𝑝(or 2 ∗ 𝑁 = 𝑛𝑝 − 1 if 𝑛𝑝 is odd), where 𝑛𝑝 is the number of power pads. 
Note that chip designer can further increase detection accuracy by partition circuit into 
more segments, but its attendant overhead by extra control circuit splitting the existing 
power rails.  
Compared to the conventional practical HT detection methodologies using 
variation factors and portioned CUT, the uniqueness of the proposed method is stated 
as follows: 
• The power measurement of each partitioned segment is more accurate, 
that will benefit the HT detection probability. In the proposed method, when the 
power of a circuit segment is measured, other circuit segments are physically 
isolated from power rails. The conventional methods either emphasize the power 
of target segment by magnifying the activity of target region or achieve the power 
of partitioned segment by mathematic analysis [56][58]. 
• The operating variable scaling factors (λ) of a global component is used to 
estimate the parametric stability of each partitioned segment. The segment is 
asserted as Trojan-attached if λ of global component exceeds prescribed limit in it. 
It is more efficient compared to conventional HT detection method using variation 
factors, which requires massive math analysis for the scaling factor of each gate on 
chip. 
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• HT detection overhead and workload can be adjusted by chip designer 
based on vulnerability of path, the desired HT resistance, and limitations on 
parameter overhead. For example, the security-sensitive portion of circuit (e.g., 
memory) is required to be covered by segment with smaller size (e.g., number of 
gates) and more power profiles need to be measured to achieve more accurate HT 
detection. The reason why more power profiles benefit detection accuracy is 
explained by Fig. 4.6 in section 4.3. Memory circuit is security-sensitive, because 
the key data stored in memory could be a target for attackers. While security-robust 
portion of circuit (e.g., critical path) can be covered by larger segment and less 
power measurements can be conducted to reduce workload and circuit overhead. 
Critical path is security-robust, because any extra connection on critical path will 
slow chip operating frequency, which can be easily revealed in post-fab functional 
test. Moreover, if detection accuracy is not critical for a segment, the operating 
variation scaling factor (λ) can be used for a group of multiple gates instead of 
single gate to tremendously reduce the computational complexity of the detection 
methodology, which is introduced in section 4.3.3. 
4.2.2 Operating Variation 
Because of variations of physical parameters and fabrication process parameters, 
transistors may have different threshold voltage (𝑉𝑡) and channel length (𝐿). In addition, 
interconnect lines may have different width, thickness, and contact resistance. All these 
can affect circuit design timing and power parameters. This situation is denoted as 
process variation that can cause up to 30% circuit performance variation in 90nm 
technology [62]. 
Power supply voltage may vary up to 10% due to capacity of voltage regulator, 
IR drops along supply rail, and noise. This will further alter the power consumption and 
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delay of a designed circuit [46]. 
Also, the increased logic density and operating frequency of modern ICs have 
exponentially magnified operational variations due to temperature fluctuations. 
Increased temperature reduces transistor switching speed meanwhile increases 
transistor leakage current, that increases chip power consumption and propagation delay. 
Normally, HTs are designed to remain dormant until activation to avoid detection. 
However, the embedded HT causes leakage current even in sleeping mode that 
contributes to static power consumption of host-circuit. Therefore, detection of an HT 
in the sleeping mode is dependent on static power consumption. Static power is 
negligible compared to dynamic power, so circuit activity causing dynamic power will 
dramatically reduce the power contribution of dormant HT on host-circuit. Also, PVT 
variations affect static power to a lesser extent than dynamic power. Circuit static power 
follows a Gaussian distribution as a function of PVT variations with the magnitude of 
the 3 standard deviation about 19% of the mean value [63]. Retaining parts within a 
3 distribution will result in 0.26% of parts being rejected. 
To check whether the input patterns and PVT variations affect circuit static power 
or not, a power measurement experimentation is set up as follows. A 1-bit full adder 
(FA) is simulated with all eight input patterns using Monte Carlo analysis to account 
for PVT variations. Three input patterns are randomly picked from Monte Carlo 
analysis (50 iterations for each input pattern). For each of the 50 Monte Carlo 
simulations, a ratio is calculated which is equal to the Monte Carlo simulated power 
consumption (measured power) over the designed power consumption (ideal simulated 
result with typical/typical model parameters). This ratio is calculated for static power 
consumption of an AND gate (G1) in the FA and is plotted in Fig. 4.2. Each axis 
represents measured over designed static power of G1 for each input pattern. Each 
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bubble is located by measured power over ideal power of G1 in the same Monte Carlo 
iteration with each of the three possible input pattern simulations. All dots on the red 
solid line in Fig. 4.2 have equal x, y, z values (same ratio of measured to simulated 
power for all three input patterns). As seen in Fig. 4.2, all bubbles distribute along the 
red line, but vary from 0.8 to 1.4 as PVT variation, which indicates the power deviation 
changes greatly with Monte Carlo PVT variations, but remains relatively close to the 
same value for all three input patterns for the same Monte Carlo iteration (same PVT 
parameters). 
 
Fig. 4.2 Static Power Deviation of Gate G1 
As mentioned in section 4.2.1, to account for the PVT effect on static power 
consumption of any designed circuits, a scaling factor 𝜆𝑖 is introduced to estimate the 
real static power of gate i based on ideal simulated power as 𝜆𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑗, where 𝑝𝑖𝑗 is the 
ideal static power of gate i with input vector j. Similarly, a scaling factor 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘 is used 
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to estimate the real static power of a clock-tree as 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘𝑝𝑐𝑙𝑘 where 𝑝𝑐𝑙𝑘 is the ideal 
static power of the clock-tree. 
4.3 Self-Reference-based HT Detection 
This section introduces the proposed HT detection algorithm and mechanism. 
Benchmark circuits are used as examples to explain the detection methodology and 
optimization of computational complexity. 
4.3.1 Self-Reference-based HT Detection Algorithm 
The flowchart of self-reference-based HT detection algorithm consists of six steps 
as shown in Fig. 4.3. 
Start
1. Partition Circuits into Segments 
2. Table Static Power of Each Gate
3. Measure Static Power in Testing Segment
4. Calculate Scaling Factors of Clock-





5. Iterate for Remaining Segments.
clkq
clkq qΛ      ∈
6.
 
Fig. 4.3 Overall Flow of Self-Reference-based HT Detection 
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1) Partition CUT into 𝑁 segments, and ensure clock-tree is in a separate single 
segment. N circuit segments use N separated power rails. HT detection accuracy is 
proportional to the ratio of HT size to the segment size where HT is located. In other 
words, detection accuracy rises with number of partitioned segments (𝑁) in CUT while 
all the partitioned segments are roughly equal in size. (Note size is estimated by total 
CMOS transistor width.)  
2) Table the ideal (simulation data in tt corner) designed static power consumption 
of each gate with specified input patterns for each segment. 
3) Power on one segment together with clock-tree, while power rails in other 
segments float. Measure static power consumption of CUT (𝑃𝑚𝑒𝑠) with different input 
patterns. 
4) To determine the mean effect of PVT variations on designed circuits, the ideal 
static power consumption of clock-tree (𝑝𝑐𝑙𝑘 ) and gates (𝑝𝑖 ) is multiplied by an 
operating variation scaling factor (𝜆). A set of m equations is formulated as shown in 
(4.5) with assumption that the testing segment consists of k gates with m static states. 
Each static state is a state with specific static power consumption.  
𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑗 = ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑗
𝑘
𝑖=1 + 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘𝑝𝑐𝑙𝑘, 𝑗 = 1…𝑚              (4.5) 
where 𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑗 is the static power consumption of CUT with static state 𝑗, 𝜆𝑖 is scaling 
factor of gate 𝑖, 𝑝𝑖𝑗 is ideal static power of gate 𝑖 with static state 𝑗. The unknown 
variables in (4.5) are 𝜆𝑖 and 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘. 
A combinational circuit with 𝐾𝑖𝑛 primary inputs has 2
𝐾𝑖𝑛 possible number of 
static states. In a sequential circuit, registers are used to divide sections of 
combinational logic, as shown in Fig. 4.4. For the sequential circuit in Fig. 4.4 with 
𝐾𝑖𝑛 inputs, there are 2
𝐾𝑖𝑛 static states for each combinational logic. Primary input 
signals propagate through one section of combinational logic in each clock cycle. Each 
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section of combinational logic can operate on a specific primary input pattern controlled 
by clock. M sections of combination logic can generate 2𝐾𝑖𝑛𝑀 static states. Also, clock 
may be ‘0’ or ‘1’ for a given input. Therefore, the number of static states for a sequential 












Fig. 4.4 Sequential Circuit Structure 
With equation set (4.5), the value of 𝜆𝑖 and 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘 are estimated by finding the 
solution that minimizes the sum squared deviation of measured (Monte Carlo simulated 
static power) and calculated static power as shown in (4.6). The power variations of 
gates are constrained to +/- 30% of the ideal calculated values because PVT variation 
affects circuit static power consumption within 30% [63]. This means (𝜆𝑖) should be 
constrained to 0.7 < 𝜆𝑖 < 1.3 . Then finding the best estimate of 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘  becomes a 
linear optimization problem as follows 
minimize ∑ (𝑃𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑗 − 𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑗)
2
𝑚





𝑗=1   
subject to 0.7 < 𝜆𝑖 < 1.3, 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑘                (4.6) 
To solve for the unknown variables in (4.6), the number of static states (𝑚) can 
vary from 1 to 𝑁𝑠, where 𝑁𝑠 is the number of total feasible static states. Using more 
static states in (4.6) are expected to generate more accurate λ by averaging the λ 
fluctuation over more operating states. However, more static states require more power 
measurements and the calculation in (4.6) is more complicated. A simple benchmark 
circuit (CUT1) is used as an example to illustrate this process. As shown in Fig. 4.5, 
CUT1 consists pipelined 3-inputs AND, OR, XOR gate and is partitioned into three 
80 
segments plus one clock-tree segment. Each partitioned segment consists of two 
combinational gates and one sequential gate (a D flip-flop). To account for process 
variation, the benchmark circuit is simulated with Monte Carlo analysis including 
process variation and mismatch. The simulated Monte Carlo results are referred to as 
the measured values. Scaling factor of the clock-tree (𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘) is calculated with number 
of static states varying from 4 to 10. For each number of static states, there are 𝐶𝑁𝑠
𝑚  
static state combinations that can be chosen, where 𝑁𝑠 is the number of total feasible 
static states, and 𝑚 is number of selected static states. For example, all segments in 
CUT1 have 32 static states. For each segment, a set of 4, 5, …, 10 static states are 
selected from the possible 32 states and 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘 deviation from ideal value of 1 resulting 


















Fig. 4.5 Partitioned CUT1 
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Fig. 4.6 𝜆clk Deviation in CUT1 
In Fig. 4.6, “𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘 deviation” represents deviation of calculated 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘 from ideal 
value of 1; 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘𝑞 is the 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘 based on calculation in segment q. As seen, a larger 
number of static states results in a solution that converges to a more accurate estimate 
of 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘. 
5) Iterate step 3, 4 for the remaining segments. 




           (4.7) 
Constraints must be placed on the threshold of values for 𝛬𝑞 for declaring a Trojan-
free or Trojan-attached segment. Seven Trojan-free benchmark circuits are designed in 
IBM 90nm CMOS technology and simulated with Monte Carlo analysis (100 samples). 
The simulation results are plotted in Fig. 4.8, where false negative is the fault that assert 
Trojan-attacked for a Trojan-free circuit; CUT1, CUT2 are customized benchmarks, 
shown in Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 4.9, respectively; s27 and s344 are ISCAS-89 benchmarks; 
c499, c6288 and c5315 are ISCAS-85 benchmarks, shown in Fig. 4.7.  
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ISCAS-89 s344 is a 4-bit multiplier which consists of 16 multiplexers, 12 D flip-
flops, 3 T flip-flops, one 4-bit full adder, and one 4-bit AND gate. ISCAS-85 c499 is a 
single-error-correcting circuit [64]. The 41 inputs are combined in module M1 to form 
an 8-bit internal bus S, which then combines with 32 primary inputs in module M2 
consisting correcting logic. Benchmark c6288 is a 16*16 multiplier formed by a 15*16 
matrix with 240 full and half adders. Benchmark c5315 is a 9-bit arithmetic logic unit 










































































































































































Fig. 4.7 ISCAS-89 Benchmarks (a) S27, (b) S344, and ISCAS-85 Benchmarks (c) 
c499, (d) c6288, (e) c5315 
84 
 
Fig. 4.8 Threshold of Clock-Tree Scaling Factor Deviation in Benchmarks 
It can be seen in Fig. 4.8 that the HT detection false negative rate is inversely 
proportional to the value of threshold of 𝛬𝑞. A smaller value for the threshold of 𝛬𝑞 
may have higher detection accuracy, while attendant a higher number of false negatives. 
Detection accuracy of Trojan-attacked circuit is highly dependent on the size-
relationship of Trojan and host-circuit. Also, it is noted that false positive (assert Trojan-
free for Trojan-attacked circuit) is related to both the host-circuit design and the 
unknown HT design. As seen in Fig. 4.8, benchmark circuits with threshold values of 
𝛬𝑞 of 10% or more have no false negatives. The seven benchmarks do not represent 
all possible circuits; however, the selected benchmarks cover a range of a few to 
thousands of gates with a few to hundreds of IO pins form a basis for selecting a 
threshold for the value 𝛬𝑞. Based on these results, 10% is chosen as a minimum value 
for 𝛬𝑞 to declare a Trojan attacked segment. Thus, segment q is identified as Trojan-
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as Trojan-attacked if 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘𝑞 > 1.3 regardless of value obtained by (4.7), since the static 
power of a segment can vary by 30% due to unknown circuit operational variables. 
Moreover, it is asserted that the clock-tree is attacked if 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘 in all segments exceeds 
1.19. This is based on discussion in section 4.2.2, where the static power 3 variation 
scale is about 19%, and only 0.26% of genuine circuits will be rejected outside of 3 
range. This means the false positive is about 0.26% for HT detection when the HT is 
embedded in clock-tree. 
The criteria for asserting a segment is Trojan attacked is summarized below: 
𝛬𝑞 ≥ 10% implies segment q is attacked; 
𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘𝑞 > 1.3 implies segment q is attacked; 
𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘 > 1.19 in all segments implies clock tree is attacked. 




HT detection algorithm 
Input: CUT, ideal static power of each gate in CUT (p) 
Output: presence and location of HT 
1.  Partition CUT into N segments; 
2.  for each segment (q) do 
3.      Power on the segment, while power rails in other 
         segments are floated; 
4.      for designed input patterns (j) do 
5.          Measure static power of CUT (𝑃𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑗) 
6.      Find 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘𝑞 by minimizing  







         subject to 0.7 < 𝜆𝑖 < 1.3, 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑘 
7.  if 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘 > 1.19 in all segments then 
8.      HT is present in clock tree;  
9.  for each segment (q) do 




11.     if 𝛬𝑞 ≥ 10% then 
12.         HT is present in segment q; 
13.     if 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘𝑞 > 1.3 then 
14.         HT is present in segment q; 
15. Return HT presence and location; 
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The proposed technique can be used for post-fab HT detection or making 
watermark for individual chip. The HT detection benefits semiconductor manufacturing 
by revealing malicious alteration of chip and evading potential harms to client. As 
mentioned in section 4.2, because of inter-chip variations, the operating parameters of 
a single gate in different chips may be varied. Therefore, the operating variable scaling 
factors (λ) of each gate in a chip can form up a unique identification (ID) for that chip 
which is also denoted as watermark. Chip watermark can be used to protect intellectual 
property (IP) against illegal counterfeiting. 
4.3.2 Example 
The proposed HT detection method is illustrated in detail with a custom designed 
benchmark circuit (CUT1). This CUT consists of pipelined 3-inputs AND, OR, XOR 
gate, and partitioned as shown in Fig. 4.5. As aforementioned, the clock-tree is 
partitioned into a single segment, and separated power rails are applied to each segment. 
As discussed in section 4.3.1, each segment in CUT1 may have 32 static states. 
To simplify the related calculation, 8 of them are picked with signal ‘clk’ equal to ‘1’. 
With the selected 8 static states, ideal static power consumption of each gate is shown 
in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Static Power of Gates in CUT1 
 Input Pattern Gate Power (nW) 𝑃𝑚𝑒𝑠 (nW) 







0 0 0 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.93 1.74 2.06 2.16 
1 0 0 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.93 1.67 2.01 2.11 
0 1 0 0.36 0.27 0.27 0.93 1.78 2.01 2.15 
1 1 0 0.51 0.35 0.27 0.93 2.06 2.38 2.47 
0 0 1 0.27 0.27 0.36 0.93 1.83 2.15 2.2 
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1 0 1 0.27 0.27 0.36 0.93 1.78 2.1 2.15 
0 1 1 0.36 0.27 0.36 0.93 1.87 2.19 2.19 







0 0 0 0.75 0.27 0.75 0.93 2.68 2.68 3.1 
1 0 0 0.49 0.35 0.49 0.93 2.26 2.26 2.68 
0 1 0 0.82 0.35 0.49 0.93 2.58 2.58 3 
1 1 0 0.49 0.35 0.49 0.93 2.26 2.26 2.68 
0 0 1 0.75 0.27 0.82 0.93 2.75 2.75 3.17 
1 0 1 0.49 0.35 0.49 0.93 2.26 2.26 2.68 
0 1 1 0.82 0.35 0.49 0.93 2.58 2.58 3 







0 0 0 0.65 0.27 0.65 0.93 2.43 2.43 2.84 
1 0 0 0.37 0.35 0.37 0.93 2.01 2.01 2.43 
0 1 0 0.79 0.35 0.37 0.93 2.43 2.43 2.85 
1 1 0 0.5 0.27 0.65 0.93 2.36 2.36 2.78 
0 0 1 0.65 0.27 0.79 0.93 2.56 2.56 2.98 
1 0 1 0.37 0.35 0.5 0.93 2.15 2.15 2.57 
0 1 1 0.79 0.35 0.5 0.93 2.57 2.57 2.99 
1 1 1 0.5 0.27 0.79 0.93 2.5 2.5 2.91 
 
The circuits in segment 1 are powered on together with clock-tree in segment 0, 
while floating the power rails in other segments. Then the actual total static power 
consumption of CUT1 with the specific 8 static states (𝑃𝑚𝑒𝑠) is measured (simulate with 
Monte Carlo analysis), that is listed in Table 4.1. There are three columns below 𝑃𝑚𝑒𝑠 
in Table 4.1, “TF”, “T1”, “T0”, that represent total power consumption of CUT1 with 
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Trojan-free, Trojan embedded in segment 1, and Trojan-embedded in segment 0, 
respectively. An inverter which bypasses original circuit path is used as the Trojan. 
For the Trojan free case, equation set (4.8), (4.9), (4.10) are created for segment 
1, 2, 3, respectively, based on the calculated total static power of CUT1 (𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙) is equal 










𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙1 = 0.27𝜆1 + 0.27𝜆2 + 0.27𝜆3 + 0.93𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘1
𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙2 = 0.27𝜆1 + 0.27𝜆2 + 0.27𝜆3 + 0.93𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘1
𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙3 = 0.36𝜆1 + 0.27𝜆2 + 0.27𝜆3 + 0.93𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘1
𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙4 = 0.51𝜆1 + 0.35𝜆2 + 0.27𝜆3 + 0.93𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘1
𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙5 = 0.27𝜆1 + 0.27𝜆2 + 0.36𝜆3 + 0.93𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘1
𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙6 = 0.27𝜆1 + 0.27𝜆2 + 0.36𝜆3 + 0.93𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘1
𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙7 = 0.36𝜆1 + 0.27𝜆2 + 0.36𝜆3 + 0.93𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘1
𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙8 = 0.51𝜆1 + 0.35𝜆2 + 0.51𝜆3 + 0.93𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘1










𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙1 = 0.75𝜆1 + 0.27𝜆2 + 0.75𝜆3 + 0.93𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘2
𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙2 = 0.49𝜆1 + 0.35𝜆2 + 0.49𝜆3 + 0.93𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘2
𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙3 = 0.82𝜆1 + 0.35𝜆2 + 0.49𝜆3 + 0.93𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘2
𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙4 = 0.49𝜆1 + 0.35𝜆2 + 0.49𝜆3 + 0.93𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘2
𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙5 = 0.75𝜆1 + 0.27𝜆2 + 0.82𝜆3 + 0.93𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘2
𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙6 = 0.49𝜆1 + 0.35𝜆2 + 0.49𝜆3 + 0.93𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘2
𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙7 = 0.82𝜆1 + 0.35𝜆2 + 0.49𝜆3 + 0.93𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘2
𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙8 = 0.49𝜆1 + 0.35𝜆2 + 0.49𝜆3 + 0.93𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘2










𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙1 = 0.65𝜆1 + 0.27𝜆2 + 0.65𝜆3 + 0.93𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘3
𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙2 = 0.37𝜆1 + 0.35𝜆2 + 0.37𝜆3 + 0.93𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘3
𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙3 = 0.79𝜆1 + 0.35𝜆2 + 0.37𝜆3 + 0.93𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘3
𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙4 = 0.5𝜆1 + 0.27𝜆2 + 0.65𝜆3 + 0.93𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘3
𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙5 = 0.65𝜆1 + 0.27𝜆2 + 0.79𝜆3 + 0.93𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘3
𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙6 = 0.37𝜆1 + 0.35𝜆2 + 0.5𝜆3 + 0.93𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘3
𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙7 = 0.79𝜆1 + 0.35𝜆2 + 0.5𝜆3 + 0.93𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘3
𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙8 = 0.5𝜆1 + 0.27𝜆2 + 0.79𝜆3 + 0.93𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘3
     (4.10) 
To find the best estimate of the scaling factor of clock-tree ( 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘1 ), 
∑ (𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑗 − 𝑃𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑗)
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𝑗=1  is minimized subject to 0.7 < 𝜆1, 𝜆2, 𝜆3 < 1.3. Excel solver is 
used to solve the linear optimization problem. Then steps are repeated for the other two 
segments to obtain 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘. The resulting estimates for 𝜆 for each segment are listed in 
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Table 4.2. As seen, the minimum 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘 is 0.87 in segment 1. The deviation of clock-
tree scaling factor in segment 2 and 3 are calculated using (4.7) and meet the Trojan-














= 5.7% < 10% 
So, CUT1 is asserted as Trojan-free. 
Table 4.2 Variation Scaling Factors in Trojan-Free CUT1 
 𝜆1 𝜆2 𝜆3 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘 
Segment 1 1 1.3 1.01 0.87 
Segment 2 0.97 1.16 1 0.95 
Segment 3 0.94 1.3 0.99 0.92 
 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed method in detecting Trojan-attacked 
circuit, this technique is applied while an inverter is embedded in segment 1 to account 
for HT. Simulated power consumption of CUT1 is listed in Table 4.1, “T1” column. As 
seen in Table 4.3, the minimum 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘 is 0.92 in segment 3. Deviation of clock-tree 














= 3.3% < 10% 
So, CUT1 is defined as Trojan-attacked, and the Trojan is likely to be located in segment 
1. 
Table 4.3 Variation Scaling Factors of Clock-Tree 
 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘1 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘2 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘3 
Trojan-Free CUT 0.87 0.95 0.92 
Trojan Embedded in Segment 1 1.42 0.95 0.92 
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Trojan Embedded in Segment 1 & 2 1.42 1.45 0.92 
Trojan Embedded in Segment 0 1.29 1.41 1.38 
  
To account for multiple HTs existing in multiple segments or single HT splitting 
in multiple segments, this technique is applied while an inverter is embedded in both 
segment 1 and segment 2 to imitate HT. As seen in Table 4.3, the minimum 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘 is 















= 57.6% > 10% 
So, CUT1 is defined as Trojan-attacked, and the Trojan is likely to be located in segment 
1 and segment 2.  
To evaluate HT detection for a clock-tree, this technique is applied while an 
inverter is embedded in segment 0 to account for HT. The calculated variation scaling 
factors of clock-tree (𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘) in Trojan-free and Trojan-attacked CUT are shown in Table 
4.3. As seen, when Trojan is embedded in segment 0, 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘 in segments 1, 2, 3 all 
exceed 1.19, that point to an HT attacked clock-tree in CUT1. 
4.3.3 Calculation Optimization 
This section introduces a methodology for reducing the computational 
complexity in this detection technique. As seen in the proposed algorithm step 4, (4.6) 
consists 𝑘 + 1  variables, k is number of gates in the specific segment. Reducing 
variables can simplify the calculation of (4.6), however detection accuracy is sacrificed. 
In order to reduce the variables, the operating variation scaling factor (λ) can be used 
for a group of multiple gates rather than a single gate. Then the number of variables in 
a testing segment is reduced from number of gates to number of gate groups. A 
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benchmark circuit (CUT2) consists ISCAS-85 c17, 2-1 MUX, 1-bit FA, as shown in Fig. 
















Segment 0 – clock-tree
clock-treeclk
Segment 2 – c17 Segment 3 – 2-1 Mux













Fig. 4.9 Partitioned CUT2 
For segment 1 in CUT2, 7 gates result in 8 variables in each equation in (4.6), 
𝜆1- 𝜆7, 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘1. However, if two gates are grouped to share one λ, as shown in Fig. 4.9, 
the 4 gate groups generate 5 variables in (4.6), 𝜆1-𝜆4, 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘1. 
To verify how the size of gate group will affect detection accuracy, the proposed 
detection method is applied to CUT2 without/with HT embedded in segment 1, 
respectively, for gates grouped with size of 1, 2, 3 and 4. The resulting estimates for 
𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘 in each segment are listed in Table 4.4, in which “Detectable HT Size” is the 
percentage of minimum detectable HT size over host-circuit size, and “Gate Group Size” 
is number of gates in each gate group. As seen, the increasing gate group size attendant 










HT Size HT-Free HT-Attacked 
1 1.006 1.338 1.017 1.028 0.021% 
2 0.981 1.421 0.983 0.997 0.138% 
3 0.954 1.756 0.965 0.997 0.173% 
4 0.998 1.36 1.077 0.997 1.38% 
 
Then the proposed detection method is applied to CUT2 with HT embedded in 
segment 0 (clock-tree segment) for gates grouped with different sizes. The results of 
HT in segment 0 and segment 1 are shown in Fig. 4.10, where “# variables” is number 
of variables in (4.6). It shows that with gate group size increasing, the number of 
unknown variables is decreased resulting in calculation simplification as indicated by 
circle markers (blue line). Also, the minimum detectable HT size is increased that 
sacrifices HT detection accuracy as shown by x and square markers (orange line). 
Detection for HT embedded in clock-tree is more difficult than for other segments of 
the chip, so the detectable size in a clock tree is typically larger than in logic segments. 
More on this in the next section. 
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Fig. 4.10 Simulation Result of CUT2 with Different Size of Gate Group 
4.3.4 HT Detection Overhead 
The impacts of HT detection on area, power consumption, timing and signal noise 
of CUT are discussed in this section. The physical alteration of original circuit design 
by the proposed HT detection technique is power supply partitioning for individual 
segments. Typically, the power supply-related issues are power voltage drop and power 
supply noise, which are discussed as follows. 
Power supply integrity is an essential part of chip design, because power-related 
issues can affect chip power consumption, timing and even lead to complete device 
failure. Systems are designed to operate at a nominal supply voltage, but the voltage 
may vary due to IR drops along supply rails [65]. This drop is ∆𝑉 = 𝐼 ∗ 𝑅, where 𝑅 is 
the supply rail resistance, 𝐼 is the current along supply rail. 
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Chip power supply suffers from switching noise on the power supply rails, which 
is subsequently coupled onto the evaluation nodes of a circuit. To preserve signal 
integrity, every circuit design has a noise margin to allow limited signal variation. Extra 
noise on supply rails may exceed circuit noise margin, resulting in circuit functional 
failure. The power rail noise is proportional to its resistance (R). 
Normally, practical chips are designed with a number of I/O pads for power rails 
to have a stable power source. When only the existing power pads are used to separate 
power segments (2 ∗ 𝑁 ≤ 𝑛𝑝), none of extra circuit is required, and the power rails are 
divided for each single segment. Power rails are typically metal rings on higher-level 
routing layers, which carry power around the periphery of the die, around a standard 
cell’s core area, and around individual hard macros. Because the power rails are cut to 
shorter for individual circuit segment, the resistance (R) of each power rail is reduced. 
The current capability (I) of each partitioned power rail is less compared to the original 
power rail, because each partitioned power rail is only account for the corresponding 
sub-circuit segment. The reduced I and R can relieve power degradation (∆𝑉 = 𝐼 ∗ 𝑅) 
and noise (proportional to R), which will not deteriorate circuit operation parameters 
(e.g., power, timing, signal noise). And the circuit area is unaltered. Note that each 
partitioned power rail is required to be designed with capability to deliver sufficient 
current for the corresponding circuit segment. 
Partitioning circuit into segments using more than existing power pads (2 ∗ 𝑁 >
𝑛𝑝 ) is not recommended, only if the detection accuracy is inadequate. Then extra 
control circuit is required to split the existing power rails for more segments. It is 
obviously increasing circuit area- and power-overhead, however because of the 
aforementioned reasons, timing and signal noise of CUT are not affected. 
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4.4 Experimental Result based on Monte Carlo Simulations 
ISCAS-85/89 benchmarks are used to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed 
detection method. Benchmarks are modified to sequential circuit by inserting registers 
in path. Inverter buffers are embedded as HT. Benchmarks are partitioned into four 
segments, in which segment 0 only consists clock-tree, and HT is randomly embedded 
in segment 1. The Trojan in each benchmark has a size of about 1% of host-circuitry. 
Gate-grouping is used to simplify detection calculation. Number of gates in each group 
varies from 4 to 35 depending on circuit size. The simulation result is shown in Table 
4.5. 











𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘1 𝛬1 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘1 𝛬1 
CUT1 9/3 9 0.95 0.92 0.87 0 1.42 54.3% 0.015-0.37 
CUT2 11/4 25 1.017 1.028 1.006 0 1.338 31.6% 0.021-0.45 
S27 5/1 13 0.87 0.91 0.92 5.7% 1.33 52.9% 0.013-0.33 
S344 9/11 175 0.94 0.97 0.96 2.1% 1.24 31.9% 0.026-0.44 
C499 41/32 202 0.89 0.94 0.92 3.4% 1.31 47.2% 0.039-0.71 
C6288 32/32 2406 1.014 1.007 1.001 0 1.21 20.2% 0.028-0.83 
C5315 178/123 2406 1.013 0.987 1.01 2.3% 1.13 14.5% 0.032-0.79 
 
As seen, deviation of clock-tree scaling factor in segment 1 (𝛬1) is within 10% in 
Trojan-free CUT, meanwhile 𝛬1 is over 10% in Trojan-attacked segment 1. Therefore, 
the proposed detection technique is effective to distinguish HT in benchmark circuits. 
The minimum detectable Trojan size is 0.013-0.83% of host-circuit size, which relies 
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on two factors: 1) based on (4.7), the larger difference of 𝑐𝑙𝑘𝑞 in the tested segment 
q from minimum 𝑐𝑙𝑘 of the CUT results in smaller detectable Trojan size in segment 
q; 2) larger size of gate group causes larger detectable Trojan size. It is noted that the 
detectable Trojan size in the clock-tree falls near the maximum number of the detectable 
Trojan size range, while a Trojan in other segments falls close to the minimum number 
of the detectable Trojan size range. A HT embedded in the clock-tree is typically more 
difficult to detect than in other segments. 
Table 4.6 lists parameters of some recently published power-analysis based HT 
detection results. The proposed self-reference method in this chapter is competitive in 
HT detection accuracy and sensitivity. 
Table 4.6 Comparison of Different Trojan Detection Method 
Reference Modality Detectable Trojan size Area overhead Trojan localization 
This Work Static Power 0.013-0.83% 0 Yes 
[66] Power 3.9% 0 Yes 
[1] Transient Power 1-6% 0 Yes 
[67] Transient Current 1.6-2.3% 0 Yes 
[68] Transient Power 0.09-2.61% 0 Yes 
[69] Transient Power 0.1% 0 Yes 
[70] Static Power 0.4% 0 No 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
A self-reference-based microelectronic circuit Hardware Trojan detection 
methodology is proposed in this chapter. An embedded HT will contribute to circuit 
overall leakage/static power, which forms the basis for the self-referenced detection 
method, where a Trojan-free genuine circuit is not required. To account for the effect 
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of PVT variations on measured post-fabrication static power, the ideal model based 
static power consumption of the clock-tree (𝑝𝑐𝑙𝑘) and gates (𝑝𝑖) is multiplied by an 
operating variation scaling factor (𝜆). The circuit is partitioned into segments, and a 
set of m equations is formulated with assumption that the testing segment consists of k 
gates with m static states. The best estimate of 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘 is found by minimizing the sum 
squared difference of the calculated static power consumption and the measured static 
power consumption under constraints for the values of the gate scaling factors. The 
estimated values of the 𝜆𝑐𝑙𝑘 in each segment are used to assert a Trojan attacked or 
Trojan free segment of the circuit. The efficiency of proposed method is evaluated on 
several ISCAS benchmarks and HT detection sensitivity and accuracy is competitive 
with other recently published power analysis results. 
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5 Combinational Use of Multiple HT Detection Techniques 
Combinational use of multiple Hardware Trojan (HT) detection techniques is 
introduced in this chapter. The effective combinational use of multiple HT detection 
techniques improves overall detection probability. Benchmark circuits are used to 
evaluate efficiency of the developed method. The discussion in this chapter is 
substantially drawn from [71], where we first reported the development and evaluation 
of this technique.  
5.1 Introduction 
HT detection has become critical in microelectronic circuit process due to 
increasing security threat. However, there is no “silver bullet” technique available yet 
that can be applied to detect all classes of Trojans. The majority of existing techniques 
address Trojan detection in manufactured ICs by a single technique that can significant 
vary in detection probability for Trojans in different classes. The effective 
combinational use of multiple HT detection techniques can improve overall detection 
probability. For example, super dormant HT which is inactive in extremely long life-
time may easily invalidate HT activation strategy or in-field HT self-detection, however 
the HT circuit used to monitor super rare triggering signal is more complicated which 
result in a relatively larger size, that could be easily detected by side-channel analysis. 
HT circuit with small size may consume very limited timing/power that can be covered 
by process variation eventually invalidate HT detection based on side-channel analysis, 
however small HT must have simple strategy to monitor trigger signal thus HT 
activation technique can easily activate HT eventually benifit side-channel analysis-
based HT detection. 
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5.2 Combinational Use of Power & Timing Analysis-based HT Detection 
This section introduces combinational use of the proposed power and timing 
analysis-based HT detection. Benchmark circuits are used as examples to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the proposed technique. 
5.2.1 Preliminary and Theory 
The power (proposed in chapter 4) and timing (proposed in chapter 3) analysis-
based HT detection methodologies are applied to circuit-under-test (CUT) with HT on 
different locations that account for different type of HT. 
Based on location characteristics in host-circuit, HTs are classified into three 
categories: in-path, by-path, and off-path, as shown in Fig. 3.8. When an input pattern 
is applied, the location of HT plays an important role on the ability to detect it, because 
of its location-dependent side-channel effects.  
Side-channel (timing, power) effects of HTs in various locations are listed in 
Table 5.1. The propagation signal in a circuit-under-test (CUT) will go through extra 
paths introduced by an in-path HT, that affects the measured transient time for some 
extent. An in-path HT may utilize the exiting signal or logic for the trigger and payload 
logic, so it can be simple and of minimal size, consuming little power. A by-path HT 
affects the CUT’s original path by introducing a capacitive load that affects the 
measured transient time to less extent. However, because of its limited interface with 
the host IC, a by-path HT may need a complicated trigger and payload design of larger 
size, resulting in greater power consumption. An off-path HT is isolated from the 
original circuit path, resulting in negligible timing alteration on the original signal 
propagation. An off-path HT is isolated from the original circuit, that requires more 
complicated trigger and payload logic to have practical effect on the host IC. Thus, an 
off-path HT requires an even larger circuit size with more power consumption.  
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Table 5.1 Side-channel Effect of HT in Various Locations 
HT Location Timing Effect Power Effect 
In-path High Low 
By-path Medium Medium 
Off-path None High 
 
Based on the analysis of HTs in various locations, timing and power effects of 
HTs on a host-circuit are trade-offs for HT designs. Therefore, a combination of power 
and timing-analysis will be more effective for a practical general HT detection 
technique. To accommodate process variation in HT detection, typically a side-channel 
variation limit is prescribed. A CUT is asserted as HT-attacked if its side-channel 
parameters fall outside of the prescribed limits. Combinational use of power and timing-
based HT detection also can restrict the prescribed limits for each method, thereby 
increasing detection probability.     
5.2.2 Example 
To evaluate the effectiveness of combining power-timing analysis-based HT 
detection, a circuit incorporating three pipelined 16-bit ripple-carry-adders (RCA) and 
a clock-tree is introduced as CUT, as shown in Fig. 5.1. The CUT is partitioned into 
three segments and clock-tree. Each partitioned segment consists of two combinational 
components (8-bit full adder) and one sequential gate (a D flip-flop). 
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Fig. 5.1 Block Diagram of CUT 
















Fig. 5.2 Segment 1 of CUT with HT (a) In-path, (b) By-path, (c) Off-path 
The proposed timing, power, and timing-power analysis-based HT detections are 
applied on the CUT with Trojans, respectively. An inverter is embedded in segment 1 
to account for in-path/by-path/off-path HT, as shown in Fig. 5.2. A detection circuit 
(green highlighted in Fig. 5.2) is attached to the HT-affected path for the proposed 
timing analysis. The CUT is designated as Trojan-attacked when the delay of testing-
path is increased by embedding the HT. Then the proposed power-based HT detection 
is applied on CUT. Power profile of fabricated circuit varies with process, voltage, and 
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temperature (PVT) variation. The PVT variation of the clock-tree is calculated based 
on power measurement of each partitioned segment. HT detection in each segment is 
dependent on the PVT variation of the clock-tree for the given segment falling outside 
of the prescribed limits. Finally, the two HT detection methodologies are combined as 
a timing-power analysis-based HT detection technique, applying to the CUT. Based on 
schematic simulation results, the minimum detectable in-path HT size over host-circuit 
size at detection probability of 90% is 3.11% with timing analysis and 0.031% with 
power analysis. A HT with size of 0.027% of the host-circuit size can be detected at the 
probability of 37% (P(timing)) and 84% (P(power)) by timing and power analysis-
based detection, respectively. While, with combinational use of the two methods, the 
HT detection probability is 
𝑃(𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = 1 − (1 − 𝑃(𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔)) ∗ (1 − 𝑃(𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟)) = 90% 
Therefore, to achieve the same detection probability, combinational use of detection 
methods decreases the minimum detectable HT size by 12.9%.  
The full experimental results are listed in Table 5.2, in which the minimum 
detectable HT size over host-circuit size is at detection probability of 90%. As expected, 
with timing-power analysis, the minimum detectable in-path and by-path HT size are 
improved by 12.9% and 9.4%, respectively, but it is ineffective for off-path HTs 
compared to the power-analysis method. 
 
Table 5.2 Detectable HT Size Over Host-circuit Size at 90% Detection Probability 
HT Timing-based Power-based Timing-power-based 
In-path 3.11% 0.031% 0.027% 
By-path 3.86% 0.032% 0.029% 
Off-path N/A 0.032% 0.032% 
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5.2.3 Experimental Results 
ISCAS-85 benchmarks are used to evaluate the effectiveness of combining power 
and timing analysis-based HT detection in general circuits. Benchmarks are modified 
to sequential circuit by inserting registers in path. Inverter buffers are embedded as HT. 
To satisfy the proposed power analysis-based HT detection, benchmarks are partitioned 
into four segments, in which segment 0 only consists clock-tree, and HT is randomly 
embedded in segment 1. A detection circuit is affiliated to the HT affected path for 
timing-based HT detection. Timing and power analysis-based HT detection methods 
are separately and combinational applied on CUT. The experimental results are listed 
in Table 5.3, in which “detectable HT/host-circuit size” is the minimum detectable HT 
size over host-circuit at detection probability of 90%. As seen in Table 5.3, timing and 
power-based HT detection benefits detecting in-path and by-path HT, but it is 
ineffective for off-path HT compared to power-based HT detection. 














S27 5/1 13 
In-path 3.12% 0.013% 0.008% 
By-path 3.87% 0.013% 0.011% 
Off-path N/A 0.013% 0.013% 
S344 9/11 175 
In-path 2.54% 0.026% 0.019% 
By-path 3.31% 0.026% 0.025% 
Off-path N/A 0.026% 0.026% 
C499 41/32 202 In-path 2.62% 0.039% 0.024% 
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By-path 3.97% 0.039% 0.031% 
Off-path N/A 0.039% 0.039% 
 
5.3 Combinational Use of HT Activation & Side-channel-based HT Detection 
Combinational use of HT activation and HT detection based on side-channel 
analysis is studied in this section. Benchmark circuits are used as examples to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the proposed technique. 
5.3.1 Preliminary and Theory 
Side-channel analysis is popular in HT detection, because of its high detection 
probability. Inserted HTs cause extra side-channel parameters consisting of timing, 
power, etc. HT can be revealed by measuring the differential side-channel parameters 
of the attacked circuit [1]. The proposed power analysis method is more accurate than 
timing analysis method on HT detection, because the differential power consumption 
of a HT-attacked circuit is easier to detect compared to differential timing. The extra 
delay in the HT-affected path resulting from the charge/discharge of the capacitance in 
the HT interface. Optimizing the size of the HT interface can effectively reduce the 
timing effect of HT on the host-circuit. The extra power in the HT-affected area is 
caused by the current paths and loads of the HT, and it is virtually independent of the 
location and interface design of the HT. 
However, power analysis-based HT detection is not a technique with consistent 
high detection probability for general HTs. For example, a HT may use power gating 
to reduce its static current during dormant mode. The structure of power gating is shown 
in Fig. 5.3. The power-gated block receives its power from a virtual power rail (VDDV), 
which is isolated from real power rail (VDD) by a group of header switch transistors. If 
power-gated technique is used in HT design, when HT is in dormant mode the HT block 
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is isolated from power supply, also the off header-switch-transistors series connecting 
with HT block can gradually decrease circuit static power consumption because of 
stacking effect. Normally HT circuits are designed stealthily to avoid being detected, 
requiring the signal “Sleep” remains ‘1’ for the majority of the life time. Therefore, the 
power-gated HT is silent in both side-channel effects and functionality, which will 

















Fig. 5.3 Power Gating 
Activation techniques may wake up a dormant HT to augment the HT effect on 
the host-chip operating parameters, facilitating detection probability of other techniques. 
We proposed a probability-increase-circuit (PIC) in chapter 2 to raise transition 
probability of rare nodes on chip to a specific level that results in the HT trigger signal 
occurs faster. We declare that power analysis-based HT detection together with signal 
activation technique will benefit HT detection probability.   
5.3.2 Experimental Results 
An experimentation was set up as follows to prove the effectiveness of 
combinational use of power analysis-based HT detection together with HT activation 
technique. A 64-bit binary comparator is used as CUT [35]. Power gated inverter buffers 
are randomly embedded in CUT to account for HT. The output of an 8-bit OR gate 
(shown in Fig. 2.4) is served as “Sleep” signal in HT power gating. All probabilities of 
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signals in Fig. 2.4 are labeled as format 𝑃0, 𝑃1 with assumption that primary inputs 
have equal probability of values. As shown, the power gated Trojan is dormant in 
255/256 rate, and active in 1/256 rate. The power gated HT with sleep signal of 8-bit 
OR gate is shown in Fig. 5.4, in which HT is dormant (isolated from power) in the 

















Fig. 5.4 Structure of Power Gated HT 
The power analysis-based HT detection method proposed in chapter 4 is applied 
on CUT with/without PIC. To satisfy the proposed power analysis-based HT detection, 
CUT is partitioned into four segments, in which segment 0 only consists clock-tree, and 
HT is randomly embedded in segment 1. Random input patterns are applied to 8-bit OR 
gate. The simulation results are listed in Table 5.4, in which the “Detectable HT/Host-
Circuit size” is the minimum detectable HT size over host-circuit (64-bit binary 
comparator) size. As seen, CUT with PIC which may active embedded HT in a longer 
time will reduce the minimum detectable HT size from 0.73% to 0.04%.  
Table 5.4 Simulation Results of Power Analysis-based HT Detection with/without HT 
Activation 
Benchmark Inputs/Outputs Gate 
Detectable HT/Host-
Circuit Size 
64-Bit Binary Comparator 128/3 1314 0.73% 
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64-Bit Binary Comparator 
with PIC 
129/3 1434 0.04% 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
The effective combinational use of multiple HT detection techniques is 
introduced in this chapter. Power and timing analysis-based HT detections are 
combined to apply to a benchmark circuit and show a distinct improvement in detecting 
in-path and by-path HTs, but it is ineffective for off-path HTs compared to power-based 
HT detection. Subsequently, side-channel analysis-based HT detection was applied 
together with an HT activation that improved detection of all classes of HTs.   
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6 Dynamic CMOS Circuit Design Optimization 
CMOS circuit design optimization is considered for optimizing parametric 
overhead of HT detection circuit. A dynamic CMOS circuit design optimization 
technique is proposed. Some general used basic components (AND gate, NAND gate, 
full adder) are applied to prove the effectiveness of the proposed technique. The basic 
idea of this technique is that avoidance of discharging pull-down-network (PDN) nodes 
during the evaluation mode is effective in optimizing power-delay-product (PDP) of 
dynamic CMOS circuits. The discussion in this chapter is substantially drawn from [72], 
where we first reported the development and evaluation of this technique. 
6.1 Introduction 
Circuit operation at high frequencies while consuming low power is one of the 
most important characteristics in designing integrated circuits (ICs). Compared with 
static CMOS circuits, dynamic CMOS circuits are faster because they have lower load 
capacitance, no contention during switching, and no static power dissipation; however 
dynamic circuits have higher power consumption due to the operating mechanism. The 
high speed of dynamic circuits resulted in this class of circuits having an important role 
in the high performance digital IC market. But in recent years, the power hungry 
dynamic ICs are becoming a heavy load for battery and heat dissipation demands in 
portable IC products [73][74]. 
The demand for high speed coupled with low power (especially in small portable 
applications) provides motivation for improvement of PDP for dynamic CMOS circuits. 
Two techniques are proposed for modifying the conventional CMOS dynamic circuit 
which significantly benefit circuit PDP. The techniques can simply modify existing 
dynamic CMOS designs with virtually no effect on layout area. Conventional 
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benchmark circuits and the modified circuits using the proposed techniques are 
implemented in IBM 90nm CMOS technology with a 1.2V power supply. Simulation 
results indicate that the proposed techniques can improve circuit PDP by 19.2% and 
61.9% in two non-inverted dynamic benchmarks, respectively, and 6.2% and 33.72% 
in two inverted dynamic benchmarks, respectively. 
























Fig. 6.1 Conventional Dynamic CMOS Circuit, (a) Non-Inverted, (b) Inverted, (c) 
Operation Modes 
 
As seen in Fig. 6.1 (a), a conventional non-inverted dynamic circuit has two 
modes of operation, pre-charge and evaluation, shown in Fig. 6.1 (c). The circuit 
initializes in the pre-charge mode, then functions in the evaluation mode. During pre-
charge mode, the signal clock is low, the clocked PMOS M1 is on and the output is 
initialized to a high voltage. In evaluation mode, the clock is high, the clocked PMOS 
M1 is turned off, so output is discharged to low through foot transistor M2 if the PDN 
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is on, otherwise output remains at a high voltage. The conventional inverted dynamic 
circuit, shown in Fig. 6.1 (b), initializes to a low voltage output in pre-charge mode, 
and functions in evaluation mode. Therefore, PDN is off in pre-charge by having the 
low dynamic circuit output as inputs, so the foot NMOS transistor is unnecessary. 
Dynamic circuits are vulnerable to input noise and leakage due to floating nodes. 
Unwanted noise on an input which intermittently exceeds threshold voltage 𝑉𝑡 may 
result in the output slowly discharging without recovering. Also, when an input node 
floats to high voltage during evaluation, the output node is slowly discharged due to 
subthreshold gate and junction leakage, again with no recovery to the desired final 
output. To overcome the noise margin and leakage problems, a voltage keeper (M3) is 
connected to output pulling up voltage when necessary, as seen in Fig. 6.1 [75]. 
6.3 Dynamic CMOS Circuit Design Optimization Techniques 
A key shortfall with the conventional circuits is the power and delay increase 
associated with discharging of nodes in the PDN which were coincidently set to a high 
voltage while taking the output node to a high voltage. Discharging of the voltage on 
nodes of the PDN also results in increase power consumption in taking the output low 
while contending with the voltage keeper attempts to maintain a high voltage. 
The proposed techniques are based on discharging PDN nodes and avoiding 
charging PDN nodes in pre-charge mode, which eliminates the need to discharge PDN 
nodes during the evaluation mode. This section will discuss the two techniques and the 
resulting performance improvements. 
6.3.1 Proposed Non-Inverted Dynamic CMOS Circuits 
During the pre-charge mode for the conventional non-inverted dynamic circuit 
design, shown in Fig. 6.1 (a), all PDN nodes are charged to Vdd while having dynamic 
outputs as inputs. The proposed technique moves the foot NMOS transistor to the top 
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of NMOS stack, which is denoted as the up-footed non-inverted dynamic circuit. A 
dynamic 2-input NAND gate, shown in Fig. 6.2, is used to illustrate the improvements 
























Fig. 6.2 Dynamic 2-Input NAND Gate, (a) Conventional, (b) Up-Footed 
 
As shown in Fig. 6.2 (a), in typical dynamic NAND gate, the signal clock and all 
inputs are ‘1’ in pre-charge, and all PDN nodes (N2, N3) are charged. Therefore, if the 
output (Y) needs to go low in evaluation, the circuit needs to discharge the output node 
(N1) and also the PDN nodes (N2, N3) resulting in increased PDP. Because 1) the 
unnecessary charging of PDN nodes consumes more power in pre-charge; 2) 
discharging PDN nodes takes more timing while pulling down output node in 
evaluation; 3) contention time of PDN pulling down output node and voltage keeper 
maintaining high voltage is increased in evaluation, resulting in more timing and power 
consumption. However, in the up-footed dynamic NAND gate, shown in Fig. 6.2 (b), 
the up-foot M2 transistor isolates the PDN from voltage high in pre-charge mode, 
eliminating any pre-charging of nodes in the PDN.  
6.3.2 Proposed Inverted Dynamic CMOS Circuits 
In the conventional inverted dynamic circuit design, shown in Fig. 6.1 (b), if 
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dynamic inputs remain ‘0’ in pre-charge, the PDN node(s) are isolated from the power 
source high voltage. However, if continuous input patterns result in charging of PDN 
nodes in one evaluation, then discharging these nodes in succeeding evaluation mode 
continues to be an issue. If the probability of inputs being high is known, the lower 
high-voltage-probability input should place at the top of PDN to minimize unnecessary 
node charging. Otherwise, we propose a 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  controlled NMOS transistor to 
discharge the PDN nodes in the pre-charge mode. The NMOS transistor used for 
discharging is denoted as node-discharger. A dynamic 2-input AND gate, shown in Fig. 
6.3, is used to illustrate the operation of the node-discharger. Fig. 6.4 (a) shows the 
expected ideal waveforms for both conventional dynamic AND gate and dynamic AND 























Fig. 6.3 Dynamic 2-Input AND Gate (a) without (b) with Node-Discharger 
For conventional dynamic AND gate, shown in Fig. 6.3 (a), node N1 is pulled up 
to high voltage in pre-charge mode. Input “AB” is “10” in the following evaluation, 
then NMOS M2 is on, M3 is off, and node N2 is charged (at time t1 shown in Fig. 6.4 
(a)). In the succeeding evaluation, input “AB” is “11”, then the PDN needs to pull down 
both nodes N1 and N2 resulting in increased PDP. However, in modified dynamic AND 
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gate, shown in Fig. 6.3 (b), the node-discharger (M5) can discharge node N2’ in 
succeeding pre-charge mode (at time t2 shown in Fig. 6.4 (a)), then regardless of 
previous input vectors, N1’ is always the only node that may need discharging. 
Simulation results in Fig. 6.4 (b) show the delay at the output is reduced 2.34ps by 




























Fig. 6.4 Operation Waveform of Dynamic 2-Input AND Gate, (a) Ideal (b) Simulation 
Although node-discharger can save power consumption during the evaluation 
mode, node-discharger itself may consume extra power during the pre-charge mode. 
The node-discharger has the entire pre-charge mode to discharge nodes, so timing is 
non-critical concern for discharging. Therefore, in order to optimize area and power 
overhead caused by node-discharger, a minimum transistor size is used. Based on 
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simulation results, for some designs, the circuit with node-discharger may consume 
more power compared with conventional circuit, but the PDP still benefits from this 
technique. 
6.4 Final Design Performance 
The benchmarks we use to validate the proposed algorithm are dynamic 3-input 
NAND gate, 3-input AND gate, and 1-bit full adder [76][77]. Circuits are implemented 
in IBM 90nm CMOS technology with a 1.2 V power supply. The widths of pulldown 
transistors are chosen to have unit resistance. Pulling up output takes place in pre-
charge mode while timing is out of concern. Then PMOS is with width to have twice 
unit resistance that reduces the load resistance of signal clock.   
The performance comparison of conventional non-inverted dynamic reference 
circuits and modified circuits is shown in Table 6.1, where the “improvement” row is 
for the improvement of up-footed circuit compared with conventional circuit. Input 
pattern changes in every clock cycle, and all input cases are used for simulations. 
As seen in Table 6.1, circuit delay and power consumption are improved in up-
footed design, in which PDP is reduced by 19.2% and 61.9% for NAND3 and 1-bit full 
adder, respectively. 
Table 6.1 Performance Improvement in Non-Inverted Dynamic Benchmarks 
  Delay (ps) Power (𝜇𝑊) PDP (fJ) 
3-Input NAND Gate 
Conventional 114.93 0.906 0.104 
Up-Foot 104.17 0.804 0.084 
Improvement 9.36% 11.3% 19.2% 
1-Bit Full Adder 
Conventional 66.59 7.086 0.472 
Up-Foot 35.81 5.035 0.18 
Improvement 46.2% 28.9% 61.9% 
116 
 
The performance comparison of conventional inverted dynamic reference circuits 
and modified circuits is shown in Table 6.2, in which “improvement” row is for the 
improvement of circuit with node-discharger compared with conventional circuit. Input 
patterns are set up to charge PDN nodes as much as possible in one evaluation, then 
pull down output in the following evaluation, in which case node-discharger improves 
the circuit performance the most. 
As seen in Table 6.2, circuit delays are reduced with node-discharger, but the 
AND gate consumes more power compared to conventional design. Because charging 
node-discharger NMOS consumes extra power during the pre-charge mode while 
charging the nodes in PDN. However, PDP of the two circuits with node-discharger are 
all reduced. 
Table 6.2 Performance Improvement in Inverted Dynamic Benchmarks 
  Delay (ps) Power (𝜇𝑊) PDP (fJ) 
3-Input AND Gate 
Conventional 72.14 2.25 0.162 
Node-Discharger 66.54 2.279 0.152 
Improvement 7.8% -1.3% 6.2% 
1-Bit Full Adder 
Conventional 16.72 5.12 0.086 
Node-Discharger 11.53 4.904 0.057 
Improvement 31% 4.2% 33.72% 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented two design techniques for improving performance of 
dynamic CMOS circuits: up-footed design by moving foot NMOS to top of NMOS 
PDN stack and node-discharger design by adding node-discharger to node(s) in PDN. 
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They both benefit circuit PDP by eliminating the need to discharge PDN nodes during 
the evaluation mode. Benchmark circuits, dynamic NAND3/AND3 gates and dynamic 
1-bit full adder, are used to validate the techniques. Cadence simulation results with 
90nm CMOS technology indicate that for non-inverted dynamic circuit, the PDP is 
reduced by 19.2% and 61.9% in two benchmarks, respectively. For the inverted 
dynamic circuit, delay is always improved, but power consumption may increase for 




7 Conclusion and Future Work 
7.1 Conclusion 
This dissertation has focused on contribution to the field of hardware Trojan (HT) 
detection and CMOS circuit design optimization that optimizes overhead of HT 
detection circuit in host-chip. 
7.1.1 Hardware Security 
A general study of hardware security has been presented. Three HT detection 
methodologies which are based on HT activation and side-channel analysis are 
proposed.  
7.1.1.1 HT Detection Efficiency Improvement 
Due to stealthy nature, typically HT is triggered by a rare signal and remain 
dormant mode in most lifetime, that lagging HT detection period. A signal probability-
increase-circuit (PIC) is proposed inserting to nodes with low transition probability for 
reducing transition time. Afterwards all nodes on host-chip could have transition 
probability more than a specific level, and rare signals in all nodes could appear in 
greater opportunity. Activation time of rare signal-triggered HT will be tremendously 
decreased, that making the HT detection more efficient. Based on simulation results, 
trigger time of rare signal in CUT is tremendously reduce with modest circuit overhead. 
7.1.1.2 Timing Analysis-based Hardware Trojan Detection 
An HT circuit embedded in testing-path will add extra capacitance, resulting in 
more charging and discharging delays to the testing-path. Then the delay time will be 
increased for a HT-attacked CUT compared to HT-free CUT due to the additional delay 
caused by HT circuit. This dissertation proposes a timing analysis-based HT detection 
technique detecting HT by revealing the timing deviation. 
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Compared to the state-of-the-art timing analysis-based detection, the main 
contributions of the proposed technique are as follows:  
• HT detection circuit area, timing, and power overhead on host-circuit are 
reduced. 
• HT detection technique is not restricted to be applications with specific paths, 
but on any circuit path by isolating the path with extra registers. 
• Location of HT can be estimated. 
• Tunable detection probability to accommodate different security requirements 
of circuit designs. 
Based on simulation results, the ratio of detectable Hardware Trojan size over 
host-circuit size ranging from 2.81% to 3.37% at 90% detection probability. For FPGA 
implementation of HT detection, the ratio of detectable HT size to host-circuit size 
ranging from approximated 0.5% to 0.9% at 90% detection probability. The detectable 
Trojan size and detection probability can be further improved by applying more 
detection circuits on testing-path. Also, ring-oscillator can be introduced to estimate 
operation temperature and process variation of testing-path to calibrate detection 
parameters, eventually improve detection probability. 
7.1.1.3 Self-Reference-based Hardware Trojan Detection 
Embedded HT will add current paths and loads to the original circuit, that result 
in extra power consumption on wires and gates in HT affected area. A self-reference-
based HT detection method is proposed revealing HT by measuring the power deviation 
of the attacked circuit. 
The main contributions of this technique are as follows:  
• HT detection method can be applied with zero-overhead. 
• Genuine chip is not needed. 
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• Location of HT can be estimated. 
• Partitioned CUT increases detection accuracy. 
• Detection accuracy is adjustable by size of partitioned segments.  
• Computational complexity is optimizable based on required detection accuracy.  
The efficiency of proposed method is evaluated on several ISCAS benchmarks 
and HT detection sensitivity and accuracy is competitive with other recently published 
power analysis results. 
7.1.1.4 Combinational Use of Multiple HT Detection Techniques 
The proper combinational use of multiple HT detection techniques can benefit 
detection probability of each technique, eventually it will be competitive than 
application of any single detection technique.  
A HT detection method may be effective for HT in some classes. Multiple HT 
will cover more kinds of HT. To accommodate process variation in HT detection, 
typically a side-channel variation limit is prescribed to reveal extra side-channel 
parameters caused by HT. CUT is asserted as HT-attacked if its side-channel parameter 
falls outside of the prescribed limits. Combinational use of multiple side-channel 
analysis-based HT detection also can restrict the prescribed limits for each other, 
eventually also facilitates detection probability. 
Benchmark circuits are used to evaluate efficiency of the developed method, and 
the proposed technique has distinct improvement in detecting HT. 
7.1.2 CMOS Circuit Design Optimization 
CMOS circuit design optimization is considered for optimizing parametric 
overhead of HT detection circuit. 
The proposed dynamic CMOS circuit design optimization is based on discharging 
pull-down-network (PDN) nodes and avoiding charging PDN nodes in pre-charge 
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mode, which eliminates the need to discharge PDN nodes during the evaluation mode. 
Simulation results indicate that for non-inverted dynamic circuit, the PDP is reduced by 
19.2% and 61.9% in two benchmarks, respectively. For the inverted dynamic circuit, 
delay is always improved, but power consumption may increase for some designs; 
however, the PDP improves by 6.2% and 33.72%, respectively for the benchmark 
circuits. 
7.2 Future Work 
7.2.1 Hardware Security 
With parameter-muted design (with power gating, etc.), HT may bypass all pre-
deployment detections. A self-detection design is required in field to compensate this 
loophole. Self-detection circuits should have three specifications: 1) low overhead, 2) 
work friendly with host-chip at speed, 3) react with HT to stop hurting chip-user (turn 
off power, etc.). The study of this detection will be the future work. 
7.2.2 CMOS Circuit Design Optimization 
Power consumption of IC consists of dynamic power and static power. Dynamic 
power is consumed by switching signals, while static power is consumed by leakage 
current when gate is not switching. Although static power is negligible compared to 
dynamic power, accumulation of million gates on chip and the circuits in sleeping mode 
make static power a primary concern. Static power is proportional to static leakage 
current which consists of gate leakage, subthreshold leakage and junction leakage [78]. 
Gate leakage is caused by thin gate oxides when a voltage is applied on gate that may 
electronically tunnel from gate to body. Subthreshold leakage occurs when a transistor 
is off that supposed to have zero current. Junction leakage current flows when source 
or drain diffusion region is at a different potential from the substrate. The study of 
circuit design optimizing these static power consumptions will be the future work. A 
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